Fusion investing: an esoteric approach to portfolio formation by Seetharam, Yudhvir
  
 
Fusion investing: 
An esoteric approach to portfolio formation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yudhvir Seetharam 
0705581W 
Supervisor: Prof. C. Auret 
 
A research report submitted to the School of Economic and Business Sciences, Faculty of 
Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment 
(50%) of the requirements for degree of Master of Commerce in Finance. 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
February 2012 
~ i ~ 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Yudhvir Seetharam, declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Commerce in 
Finance at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted 
before for any degree or examination at this or any other university.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
Yudhvir Seetharam 
February 2012 
 
~ ii ~ 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank the following people for their immense support and reciprocal altruism: 
Prof. Christo Auret, my supervisor; 
Craig Ashley Nichol, my contrarian critic; 
James Britten, CFA, a fundamental driver in the research process; 
David McClelland and Daniel Page, fellow Masters students. 
  
~ iii ~ 
 
Definitions of Terms and Abbreviations 
Adaptive Market Hypothesis: A new version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis where 
efficiency is seen as cyclical – dependent upon the interaction of market participants at any 
point in time. 
AMH: Adaptive Market Hypothesis 
Attribution Theory: A theory in social psychology that strives to determine how individuals 
explain causes of behaviour and events (Heider, 1958).  
Autocorrelation (or serial correlation): The dependency of one observation at a point in 
time to another observation at another point in time. If autocorrelation is present in a data 
series, particular forms of statistical analysis cannot be conducted without first correcting or 
accounting for autocorrelation. 
Bayes Theorem: A theorem in statistics that links the degree of belief in an outcome before 
and after accounting for evidence (Bayes and Price, 1763). 
Behavioural Portfolio Theory: A theory which states that investors create a portfolio that 
meets a broad range of goals. The portfolio can be thought of as a pyramid, where each layer 
represents a different goal. 
Bernstein’s Theorem: Any real-valued function on the line [0, ∞) that is strictly monotone is 
a mixture of exponential functions. Non-negative functions which have a strictly monotone 
derivative are referred to as Bernstein functions (Bernstein, 1928). 
CDF: Cumulative distribution function 
Contrarian investing: See value investing 
EMH: Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Esoteric: Intended for or understood by a particular group of individuals. 
Fama and French three factor model: A micro-economic model that attempts to explain 
share returns via three factors: a value factor (HML), a size factor (SMB) and a share’s beta. 
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: A hypothesis that stipulates the tendency of management to 
spend excess cash flow on negative net present value projects as opposed to a payout to 
shareholders.  
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Fusion investing: A style of investing that combines fundamental, technical and behavioural 
analysis with no regard to traditional asset classes. 
Fusion fund returns: Returns of the fusion fund, calculated as monthly fluctuations in the 
price of the fusion portfolio. 
Fusion strategy returns: Returns of the fusion strategy, calculated as 12 month buy-and-
hold returns, averaged over 12 months. 
Gaussian distribution: Also referred to as a normal distribution, this is a continuous 
distribution which has a “bell-shaped” probability density function. It was first introduced by 
Gauss (1857).  
Information Theory: A theory developed by Shannon (1948) to quantify information.  
Informational Theory of Investment: A newly developed theory of investment based on the 
premise of information theory. Under this setting, information is regarded as a reduction of 
entropy. When combined with a learning algorithm, this theory is helpful in analysis of 
market patterns.  
J=6, K=6 momentum strategy: Under this notation, the first number corresponds to the 
number of periods of historical data used to calculate past returns. The second number 
corresponds to the number of periods the share is held in the portfolio.  
JSE: Johannesburg Securities Exchange Ltd. 
January effect: The January effect refers to the tendency of shares to generate above-average 
returns in the month of January. It was first documented in Wachtel (1942).  
Mental accounting: A process consisting of coding, categorisation and evaluation of 
economic outcomes. 
MPT: Modern Portfolio Theory 
PMPT: Post-Modern Portfolio Theory 
Prospect Theory: A descriptive theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) which tries to 
reconcile real world actions and behaviour of investors with that of utility theory. 
SD: Stochastic Dominance 
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Rational expectations: A presumption of the Efficient Market Hypothesis where agents’ 
predictions of the future value of economically relevant variables are not systematically 
wrong - the errors are random (Muth, 1992).  
Value investing: Also known as contrarian investing, value investing is based on correctly 
identifying shares that are inexpensive relative to a price multiple and purchasing these shares 
to generate profitable returns in the long term.  
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Fusion investing: 
An esoteric approach to portfolio formation 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study contributes to the debate on active and passive portfolio management by providing 
an alternate means of constructing an active portfolio. This “fusion strategy” has 
underpinnings in the realm of behavioural finance, namely the value-growth phenomenon and 
the momentum effect.  The fusion strategy developed in this study was compared against two 
passive benchmarks and four active benchmarks. All returns are calculated net of transaction 
costs, initially set to 1% per month per share. Statistical testing, done via stochastic 
dominance, yielded inconclusive results in the majority of cases. The exception however, was 
that Fund B stochastically dominated the fusion strategy at second order. This implies that a 
risk-averse investor would prefer to invest in Fund B. By the use of Sharpe and Treynor 
ratios, the results were also inconclusive. However, the Sortino ratio shows that the fusion 
strategy outperforms all benchmarks chosen, except Fund A. The performance of the fusion 
strategy was also not induced by either a sector rotation strategy, the existence of the January 
effect or by the level of transaction costs.  
 
 
 
  
~ vii ~ 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................. x 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Research problem and objectives ................................................................................ 3 
1.2 Summary of findings ................................................................................................... 4 
2 Literature Review............................................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Active and passive portfolio management .................................................................. 6 
2.1.1 The forms of market efficiency............................................................................ 6 
2.1.2 An alternative view of efficiency ......................................................................... 7 
2.1.3 The role of transaction costs ................................................................................ 8 
2.2 Portfolio Theory – developments and applicability .................................................... 9 
2.2.1 Semi-deviation as a measure of risk .................................................................. 10 
2.3 Value investing .......................................................................................................... 12 
2.4 Fundamental investing .............................................................................................. 13 
2.4.1 Prior fundamental analysis research .................................................................. 14 
2.4.2 A contrarian strategy with fundamentals ........................................................... 16 
2.5 Momentum investing................................................................................................. 16 
2.5.1 Definition and early history ............................................................................... 16 
2.5.2 Related empirical findings ................................................................................. 17 
2.5.3 Possible explanations of momentum ................................................................. 18 
2.5.4 A contrarian strategy with momentum .............................................................. 19 
2.6 Fusion investing ........................................................................................................ 20 
2.7 The role of stochastic dominance in empirical finance ............................................. 21 
2.8 Explanations from behavioural finance..................................................................... 23 
2.8.1 A behavioural framework for investing ............................................................. 23 
2.8.2 The over- and under- reaction hypotheses ......................................................... 25 
2.8.3 The overconfident investor ................................................................................ 28 
2.8.4 A unified theory of over- and under- reaction ................................................... 28 
2.9 Summary ................................................................................................................... 29 
3 Data and Methodology ..................................................................................................... 30 
3.1 Data ........................................................................................................................... 30 
3.2 Value investing .......................................................................................................... 30 
3.3 Fundamental investing .............................................................................................. 31 
~ viii ~ 
 
3.3.1 Profitability ........................................................................................................ 32 
3.3.2 Leverage, liquidity and source of funds ............................................................. 33 
3.3.3 Operating efficiency........................................................................................... 34 
3.3.4 Composite score ................................................................................................. 34 
3.4 Momentum investing................................................................................................. 35 
3.5 Statistical methodology ............................................................................................. 36 
3.5.1 Proper risk aversion ........................................................................................... 37 
3.5.2 Orders of stochastic dominance ......................................................................... 37 
3.5.3 The link to mean-variance analysis.................................................................... 39 
3.5.4 Methods of analysing performance .................................................................... 40 
4 Results .............................................................................................................................. 43 
4.1 Screening criteria....................................................................................................... 43 
4.2 Portfolio returns......................................................................................................... 47 
4.3 Risk-adjusted performance ........................................................................................ 51 
4.4 Statistical results ........................................................................................................ 55 
4.5 Robustness tests......................................................................................................... 57 
4.5.1 Comparison with the business cycle .................................................................. 57 
4.5.2 Calendar effects ................................................................................................. 59 
4.5.3 Sensitivity to transaction costs ........................................................................... 61 
4.6 Statistical caveats ...................................................................................................... 63 
4.6.1 Data mining bias ................................................................................................ 63 
4.6.2 Non-synchronous trading bias ........................................................................... 63 
4.6.3 Small sample bias .............................................................................................. 63 
4.6.4 Time period bias ................................................................................................ 64 
4.7 Potential causes of portfolio (under-) performance ................................................... 64 
4.8 Discussion and inferences ......................................................................................... 65 
5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 68 
5.1 Summary of findings ................................................................................................. 68 
5.2 Recommendations for future research....................................................................... 69 
References ................................................................................................................................ 71 
Appendix A .............................................................................................................................. 81 
Appendix B .............................................................................................................................. 83 
Appendix C .............................................................................................................................. 87 
 
~ ix ~ 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 – Venn diagram of the fusion strategy ........................................................................ 4 
Figure 2 – Evolution of utility functions (Lopes, 1987). ......................................................... 22 
Figure 3 – A weighting function used in Cumulative Prospect Theory .................................. 22 
Figure 4 – First order stochastic dominance ............................................................................ 38 
Figure 5 – Second order stochastic dominance........................................................................ 39 
Figure 6 – Logarithm of maximum and minimum B/M ratios ................................................ 44 
Figure 7 – Number of firms with a Piotroski score of 7 or more............................................. 45 
Figure 8 – Number of firms that pass all three screening criteria ............................................ 47 
Figure 9 – Fusion strategy returns ........................................................................................... 51 
Figure 10 – Fusion fund returns ............................................................................................... 51 
Figure 11 – CDFs of the fusion strategy and Fund B .............................................................. 56 
Figure 12 – CDFs of the fusion fund and the Small Cap Index ............................................... 56 
Figure 13 – CDFs of the fusion fund and Fund B.................................................................... 57 
Figure 14 – Stylised depiction of the business cycle ............................................................... 58 
Figure 15 – Analysis of calendar month returns of the fusion strategy ................................... 60 
Figure 16 – Analysis of calendar month returns of the fusion fund ........................................ 61 
Figure 17 – Momentum life cycle hypothesis.......................................................................... 70 
 
  
~ x ~ 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 – The value screen ...................................................................................................... 43 
Table 2 – The Piotroski screen ................................................................................................. 44 
Table 3 – The momentum screen ............................................................................................. 46 
Table 4 – Descriptive statistics with the fusion strategy.......................................................... 49 
Table 5 – Descriptive statistics with the fusion fund ............................................................... 50 
Table 6 – Sharpe and Treynor ratios using returns from the fusion strategy ........................... 53 
Table 7 – Sharpe and Treynor ratios using returns from the fusion fund ................................ 53 
Table 8 – Sortino ratios with the fusion strategy ..................................................................... 54 
Table 9 – Sortino ratios with the fusion fund .......................................................................... 54 
Table 10 – Sector rotation according to the business cycle ..................................................... 58 
Table 11 – Sensitivity analysis of transaction costs for the fusion strategy ............................ 61 
Table 12 – Sensitivity analysis of transaction costs for the fusion fund .................................. 62 
 
  
~ 1 ~ 
 
1 Introduction 
Finance theory unequivocally states that in efficient markets, a portfolio manager who utilises 
active strategies cannot outperform his counterpart who utilises passive strategies, after 
transaction costs. Many academics and practitioners have investigated this claim and whilst 
there is consensus amongst groups of individuals, there is no ruling on the claim itself. In this 
study, focus is given as to whether pricing anomalies found in the literature can be exploited 
simultaneously. This study contributes to the debate on active and passive portfolio 
management by providing an alternative means of constructing an active portfolio. The 
strategy is referred to as a fusion strategy and has underpinnings in the realm of behavioural 
finance, namely the value-growth phenomenon and the momentum effect. 
“Fusion investing is a relatively new approach that attempts to integrate traditional and 
behavioural paradigms to create more robust investment models” (Lee, 2003, p. 1). The term, 
fusion investing, was first presented by Lee (2003). The concept of incorporating behavioural 
finance into share valuation was new at this stage of the financial markets profession. 
Although the author did not formalise the idea, this presentation was simply to raise 
awareness of incorporating behavioural finance into share valuation.  
The first study to suggest the use of a sentiment indicator in the valuation of a share was 
conducted by Shiller (1984). The author considered a universe where there are two types of 
traders – information traders (known as the “smart money”) and noise traders (the ordinary 
investor). The model presented by the author shows that price is a weighted average of 
fundamental value and noise trader demand. In the presence of transaction costs, price will 
not necessarily equal fundamental value. As fundamental analysis provides a component of 
the share price, information traders (rational investors) need to consider trends. This is similar 
in notion to the Keynesian idea that the financial market is a “beauty contest” (Keynes, 
1938).  
Bird (2007) provided the first formal introduction to fusion investing. Using his prior studies 
as examples, Bird (2007) expanded upon the idea of fusion investing. He suggested that three 
different approaches to exploiting pricing differences be investigated: the value approach, 
fundamental approach (accounting-based analysis) and momentum approach. The earliest 
(and perhaps only known literature) on the evaluation of a fusion strategy is that of Bird and 
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Casavecchia (2007b). The study focuses on European markets during the period 1989 to 
2004. The authors find that both enhancements (momentum and fundamentals), 
independently and in combination, improve the timing ability of the manager in selecting 
value and growth stocks and that the momentum enhancement subsumes the fundamental 
enhancement in better identifying value shares.  
The premise of investing on the existence of anomalies in the market or in particular asset 
classes has become known as style investing and is popular amongst actively managed funds. 
In the financial market environment, investors (or portfolio managers) classify assets into 
broad categories such as large-cap shares, government bonds, venture capital, inter alia and 
thereafter decide how much of capital to invest in each class (R. Bernstein, 1995).  
Some investment styles have a record of producing respectable long-term results. Even the 
most successful styles and strategies, however, sometimes experience extended dry spells. 
Indeed, styles that pay off in one economic environment frequently fail in another one. 
Obviously, any technique that can predict the performance of various styles would be of 
considerable practical value. (Arnott, Kelso, Kiscadden and Macedo, 1989, p. 28) 
The authors explore the possibility of selection styles in portfolio formation. However, they 
state that implementation of a particular style, whilst generating high returns, will also 
generate high turnover and transaction costs. For example, the use of style momentum 
investing1 is in and of itself a driver of high returns and high transaction costs. Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003) state that the popularity of assets depends on their performance. Thus, 
investors would flock to those assets that provide better returns, thereby driving up prices in a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. This shows the impact of investor sentiment in financial markets 
(Seetharam, 2010). Chen and De Bondt (2004) suggest that astute investors should 
incorporate style characteristics into their asset allocation strategies. The authors show that 
investors that follow styles based on size, book-to-market ratios or dividend yields could earn 
superior returns over the period 1977 to 2000.  It is unclear however, what the explanations 
are for the cross-sectional differences in returns, or whether they are rational (irrational) in 
nature.  
                                                 
1
 Style momentum is a form of sector rotation that buys those shares that had the best past returns and sells short 
those shares that had the worst past returns (Chen & De Bondt, 2004). 
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van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) investigate the cross-sectional explanatory power of 
various style characteristics on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange Ltd. (JSE). Six 
candidate factors are found to be significant out of a total of 24 effects investigated. In the 
construction of a multifactor model, size and price-to-earnings ratios are found to have the 
most explanatory power. This supports the work of van Rensburg (2001) in testing a 
multifactor pricing model on South African shares. Whilst the factors (and ensuing model) 
had no theoretical explanation at the time of publishing, the authors acknowledge that the 
above mentioned factors are anomalies on the JSE. Thus, an investment strategy should 
(hypothetically) be able to exploit these anomalies profitably.  
1.1 Research problem and objectives 
From the perspective of an active fund manager, three questions need to be asked (as per 
Bird, 2007): 
1. Is the market you operate in efficient? If not, why is it inefficient? 
2. Would these inefficiencies persist in the future? 
3. How does your investment strategy exploit these inefficiencies?  
The focus of this study is on the last point listed above. Given that literature (both local and 
international) has documented the existence and non-existence of the value-growth2 and 
momentum3 anomalies in South Africa, an attempt is made to design a strategy that utilises 
these pricing inefficiencies, assuming the above inefficiencies to be present in the South 
African market yet not necessarily throughout the entire sample period4. Further, literature 
has shown that a combination of a value strategy or fundamental strategy with a momentum 
strategy seems a viable means of achieving above average returns (see Bird & Casavecchia 
2007a; 2007b). Thus, this research aims to encapsulate the idea by Lee (2003) and Bird and 
Casavecchia (2007b) by designing an investment strategy that exploits the value, fundamental 
and momentum anomalies. Although the screening methods are chosen based on prior 
studies, no published study has utilised these screens in the sequence outlined below. This 
study therefore offers an interpretation of fusion investing.  
                                                 
2
 Fama and French (1993), Basiewicz and Auret (2010), inter alia. 
3
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Fraser and Page (2000), inter alia. 
4
 This point is clarified in Section 2.1.2. 
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Consider Figure 1 below. Each shaded circle represents a sample space. From the population 
of all shares, those considered value shares are selected. From that sample, those that are 
fundamentally sound and exhibit winning momentum characteristics are chosen. The first two 
screens are evaluated on an annual basis whereas the final screen is evaluated monthly. As 
firms release financial statements annually, any significant information contained in this 
release would cause the firm’s share price, as well as related data, to change in the long term. 
The inclusion of a monthly momentum screen should be effective in capturing short term 
fluctuations present between releases of financial statements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Venn diagram of the fusion strategy 
Thus, any share that passes all of the above criteria is considered inexpensive (the value 
screen), financially sound (the Piotroski screen) and has positive prior performance (the 
momentum screen).  
This study draws on differing areas of the literature to present a comprehensive opinion on 
the fusion strategy. Apart from implications for efficient markets, the psychological evidence 
surrounding the above financial anomalies as well as the practical implications for the fusion 
strategy are investigated. For instance, based on the work of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), 
this study informally analyses the performance of the fusion strategy over business cycles as 
the above cited literature show that size, value, and momentum factors track business cycles.  
1.2 Summary of findings 
The fusion strategy developed in this study was compared against two passive benchmarks 
and four active benchmarks. An additional comparison was conducted with the fusion 
Value
(Annual Screen)
Piotroski
(Annual Screen)
Momentum
(Monthly Screen)
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strategy and an (artificial) equally weighted ALSI. All returns are calculated net of 
transaction costs, initially set to 1% per month. Statistical testing, done via stochastic 
dominance, yielded inconclusive results in the majority of cases. The exception however, was 
that Fund B stochastically dominated the fusion strategy at second order. This implies that a 
risk-averse investor would prefer to invest in Fund B and that Fund B has a greater 
probability of achieving higher returns than the fusion strategy. However, it is interesting to 
note that the above results, whilst true statistically, do not provide a complete picture. By the 
use of risk-adjusted portfolio performance measures, specifically the Sharpe and Treynor 
ratios, the fusion strategy yields mixed results. However, the Sortino ratio shows that the 
fusion strategy outperforms most of the benchmarks it was compared against. The 
performance of the fusion strategy was also not induced by either a sector rotation strategy or 
the existence of the January effect. Sensitivity to the level of transaction costs was also 
investigated. The level of transaction costs that results in a break-even return for the fusion 
strategy was found to be at least 6.50% per month. This amount is economically significant. 
Thus, notwithstanding the significant influence of transaction costs, the results are promising.  
As this study is pioneering in South Africa, various avenues for research can be explored. 
Empirically, one can alter the fusion strategy to more accurately determine which optimal 
combination of screening criteria as well as screening delineation points (such as a median 
split instead of quartiles), provides the best performance. Theoretically, one can explore the 
nature of the “fusion investor”, with particular emphasis to his utility function and interaction 
with the rest of the market.  
This study will proceed as follows. An overview of the literature surrounding this field and its 
direct relations will be examined in Chapter 2. Thereafter, Chapter 3 outlines the fusion 
strategy and appropriate statistical methodology for analysis of its returns. Chapter 4 presents 
and discusses the results along with particular sensitivity tests and biases that were present in 
this study. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides an excursus into the caveats and avenues for future 
research of this study, ending with a conclusion. Appendix A provides mathematical 
derivations for select components of the statistical methodology, Appendix B provides 
additional graphs of stochastic dominance tests and Appendix C details the results of the 
fusion strategy against an (artificial) equally weighted passive benchmark.  
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2 Literature Review 
The chapter begins with a summary of active and passive management of portfolios. This 
discussion will inherently include background into the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) 
and the role of transaction costs. Thereafter, the literature surrounding modern portfolio 
theory (with specific focus to the most recent developments) will be analysed. Finally, an 
extensive analysis of the fusion strategy’s components will be conducted, followed by the 
statistical method used to examine the returns and ending with explanations offered from 
behavioural finance. 
2.1 Active and passive portfolio management 
A simple question lies at the heart of both finance academia and practice – can a portfolio 
manager achieve superior returns than the market, after costs? A plethora of studies have 
been conducted, and yet there has been no clear consensus of whether active or passive 
portfolio management is more beneficial in terms of returns. Underlying the question is the 
theory surrounding the EMH. Whilst it is not the purpose of this review to provide an 
extensive discourse on EMH literature, a brief discussion is instructive.  
Kendall (1953) analysed a sample of firms from the United Kingdom and found that no 
autocorrelation was apparent in share prices. This implied that prices behaved in a random 
manner, with equally likely probabilities of increasing, decreasing or remaining the same. 
Roberts (1959) enhanced this implication by analysing shares in the United States. Using 
these two findings, Fama (1965) presented the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. Since its 
publication, the EMH has generated much debate amongst academics and practitioners alike. 
To date, whilst there may be a consensus in some circles, there is no definitive proof of 
whether the EMH holds.  
2.1.1 The forms of market efficiency 
The EMH requires that agents have rational expectations (that is, on average, the population 
of agents are correct, even when no single agent is) and that these agents update their 
expectations whenever new information arises. The EMH requires that investors’ reactions 
follow a Gaussian distribution so that no abnormal profits can be realised. Each of the forms 
of efficiency, as described by Fama (1965) requires a differing set of requirements to hold 
true. 
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The weak form of market efficiency states that future prices cannot be predicted by analysing 
past prices. In the long run, investment strategies will not earn excess returns after costs. 
More specifically, strategies focused on technical analysis will not be able to consistently 
produce excess returns whereas strategies focused on fundamental analysis may still provide 
excess returns. Statistically, share prices do not exhibit serial correlation – they follow a 
random walk. 
The semi-strong form of market efficiency provides that share prices adjust quickly to public 
information. Neither a fundamental- nor a technical analysis-based strategy will earn excess 
returns. However, those that have access to private information may be able to obtain 
superior returns.  
Lastly, under strong form efficiency, share prices fully reflect both public and private 
information. Thus, no sustainable superior returns, after costs, can be achieved in the long 
run. 
There is a vast amount of literature surrounding tests for market efficiency.5 This study 
indirectly offers a test of the semi-strong and weak forms of efficiency as it utilises financial 
statement analysis in its methodology. 
2.1.2 An alternative view of efficiency 
The EMH asserts that financial markets are informationally efficient. That is, one cannot 
consistently achieve returns in excess of average market returns on a risk-adjusted basis, 
given the information publicly available at the time the investment is made. Tests of the EMH 
have yielded both positive and negative results. Inevitably, once a particular result is found, it 
becomes prone to criticism, sometimes rightfully so. For example, Malkiel (2005) states 
irrevocably that a passive index fund has significantly beaten an active fund over a 30 year 
horizon. From this the author concludes that the EMH holds. Malkiel (2005) however fails to 
mention that transaction costs have not been taken into account – an important factor in 
deciding which strategy is superior.  
Roberts (1959) is one of the early academics to suggest enhancing technical analysis with the 
aid of fundamental analysis. At a time pre-dating the publication of both the EMH and the  
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), the suggestions of Roberts (1959) 
                                                 
5
 The interested reader is referred to Sewell (2011) for an extensive discussion. 
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show that irrespective of whether one perceives the market to be efficient, one can still 
economise time in the search for greater returns.  
Lo (2004 and 2005) describes a new form of market theory – the Adaptive Market Hypothesis 
(AMH). This approach utilises concepts from finance and the principles of evolution. It is 
simply stated as follows: “Prices reflect as much information as dictated by the combination 
of environmental conditions and the number and nature of ‘species’ in the economy” (Lo, 
2005, p. 19). Species refer to market participants (asset managers, hedge funds, traders, inter 
alia). Thus, the efficiency of the market at any point in time is related to the factors of 
evolution and competition present.  
It presents a simple, philosophical and pleasantly intuitive view of market efficiency. Market 
efficiency can be seen as cyclical. There are times of inefficiency and efficiency. For a 
market to become efficient, it must first be inefficient and vice versa. The influence of market 
participants (through trading or financial product innovation) influences this efficiency, 
sometimes in a disruptive way. To date, no formal methodology has been published on 
testing the AMH. However, authors have nonetheless proposed and tested methods (for 
example, Todea, Ulici & Silaghi, 2009; inter alia). It is with this viewpoint (in support of the 
AMH), that this study draws upon. In relation to the objectives set forth in Chapter 1, it was 
assumed that the market in which the fusion strategy is developed and implemented in is 
inefficient, with these inefficiencies possibly persisting into the future. The AMH enhances 
this assumption by stating that these inefficiencies are cyclical in nature. Thus, one would 
expect the fusion strategy to have periods of both superior and inferior performance. 
2.1.3 The role of transaction costs 
Transaction costs consist of two components – explicit costs, such as brokerage fees and 
taxes; and implicit costs, such as bid-ask spreads and the price impact of the trade 
(Boussema, Bueno & Sequier, 2001). As implicit costs are difficult to quantify, many studies 
instead deduct a fixed percentage of the value of each trade to account for trading costs. This 
value is referred to as unconditional trading costs.  
Studies that have utilised unconditional, round-trip6 trading costs range from 0.5% 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) to 1.5% (Grundy & Martin, 2001). Friedrich (2010) finds that a 
range of between 0.5% and 0.6% is considered a conservative amount for South African 
                                                 
6
 Round-trip trading costs refer the costs of entering and subsequently exiting a position.  
~ 9 ~ 
 
shares of high liquidity. Ray and Schmid (2005) conduct stress testing on the value of trading 
costs to determine the point at which the returns of their momentum strategy becomes 
statistically insignificant at the 90% level of significance. A value of 1.22% a month achieves 
this goal, whilst a value of 2.06% eliminates the momentum profits (from an economic 
perspective). This study uses an amount of 1% per share per month for transaction costs. This 
is discussed further in Chapter 3.  
2.2 Portfolio Theory – developments and applicability  
Another line of thought parallel to the EMH is known as Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). 
The fundamental building block of MPT is mean-variance optimisation developed by 
Markowitz (1959). Simply, mean-variance optimisation posits that investors should be 
compensated for additional levels of non-diversifiable risk. This optimisation is given by 
efficient portfolios which focus on three key variables: mean return, correlation and standard 
deviation. MPT relies on these statistical tools to enable the portfolio manager to select those 
shares which will provide the highest return at a given level of risk (and vice versa) in 
equilibrium conditions. Indeed, an entire field of research and practice has been born out of 
the analysis of a single variable of MPT, the standard deviation (most commonly given by σ), 
in non-equilibrium conditions. Nevertheless, a shortcoming of standard deviation as a 
measure of risk is that it measures both upside and downside risk. Further, its use relies on 
asset returns following a Gaussian distribution.   
The salient point is that the use of standard deviation, no matter how accurate it may be, does 
not satisfy the needs of an investor.7 Further, a distinction should be made between volatility 
and risk. According to MPT, standard deviation is synonymous with risk. However, standard 
deviation simply refers to the volatility of returns – a higher standard deviation implies that 
returns are more volatile. Ceteris paribus, investors prefer less volatility to more volatility. 
However, not all investors prefer less risk to more risk. Indeed, risk can be seen as an 
emotional aspect of investing. Investors perceive risk as either: the risk of loss, the risk of 
underperformance or the risk of failing to meet one’s goals (Swisher and Kasten, 2005). A 
new measure, semi-variance and consequently, downside risk, measures only those returns 
                                                 
7
 Under the assumptions of MPT, the typical investor is assumed to be risk-averse. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) challenge this assumption, which resulted in the emergence of Prospect Theory. Under Prospect 
Theory (more specifically the concept of loss aversion), the investor strongly prefers to avoid losses rather 
than acquire gains. 
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that fall below the mean. This new measure is intuitively appealing and as such, Post Modern 
Portfolio Theory (PMPT) uses downside risk as the measure on which to compare returns 
against. Surprisingly, Markowitz (1959) states that “downside semi-variance” would be a 
more appropriate measure for building portfolios (Markowitz, 1959, p. 194).   
2.2.1 Semi-deviation as a measure of risk 
The use of standard deviation presents several challenges. First, its use is reliant on the 
underlying distribution of returns being symmetric and following a Gaussian distribution. 
Bekaert, Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1998) show that asset returns, particularly in emerging 
markets, do not meet the above criteria. Given that standard deviation is a component of 
MPT, if standard deviation is considered ineffective in its use, one must then question the 
applicability of MPT including the use of the equilibrium measure of risk, β (beta). As a 
result, the use of semi-deviation has received favour amongst academics and practitioners 
alike. It is defined as: 
  = {mın[ −  , 0]}  {1} 
where R denotes the asset return and B denotes the benchmark or target return. The above 
formula considers those returns that fall below the benchmark only. Thus, it is a measure of 
downside risk. 
The practicality of the above measure is twofold. It combines two statistical measures, 
variance and skewness, into a single statistic, making it a useful inclusion in one-factor 
models. Second, semi-deviation is applicable when the underlying distribution is either 
symmetric or asymmetric. 
Empirical studies such as Sortino and van der Meer (1991) and Estrada (2001), inter alia, 
have tested the use of semi-deviation as a measure of risk. In cross-sectional returns and 
cross- sectional industry tests, the statistic was found to be an appropriate measure of risk.  
The performance of portfolio managers under MPT was measured by ratios that unitise 
returns per level of risk. Examples include the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966), the Treynor ratio 
(Treynor, 1965), the Information ratio (Sortino and Price, 1994) and Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 
1968). The Sharpe ratio uses the standard deviation of total portfolio returns in excess of a 
risk free rate to measure a manager’s performance. It is simple and intuitive to use yet ignores 
diversification of the portfolio. The Treynor ratio creates a characteristic line to evaluate 
manager performance. It measures portfolio beta relative to a market index proxy. Whilst the 
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ratio is simple and intuitive to use for a cost-benefit comparison, the values obtained are often 
difficult to interpret and often ignore unsystematic risk. Sortino and Price (1994) derive the 
Information Ratio which measures standard deviation of return in excess of a benchmark, to a 
style index (in other words, tracking error). It provides a direct comparison of performance to 
a benchmark per style of investing yet it implicitly assumes that both portfolios have the 
same level of systematic risk. Finally, Jensen’s alpha is one of the few measures that rely on 
regression techniques for estimating performance where the deviation between the returns 
generated by any asset pricing model and the actual asset return is captured by an intercept 
term, alpha. Whilst a regression approach might yield more accurate results, it relies on the 
presumption of the particular asset pricing model as an appropriate model of risk (this 
includes measuring an asset’s beta and using an appropriate market proxy instead of the 
elusive market portfolio itself). Modigliani and Modigliani (1997) develop a risk-adjusted 
performance measure. It is simple to understand, similar in vain to the Sharpe ratio yet 
significantly easier to interpret. However, this ratio also relies on the use of standard 
deviation – the use of which is questioned (as discussed previously). Goetzmann, Ingersoll 
and Spiegel (2007) develop a Manipulation Proof Performance Measure (MPPM). The 
MPPM is a (1) single valued score which is (2) independent of monetary value and (3) the 
uninformed investor cannot enhance estimated score. The authors outline four conditions for 
a measure to be considered manipulation proof. The measure should (1) result in an increase 
score with increased return, (2) the function should be concave, (3) it should be time 
inseparable and (4) it should have a power utility form. This implies that informed investors 
should be able to get higher scores. Goetzmann et al. (2007) show that the measure is better 
at detecting and ranking fund performance over many other popular performance measures. 
However, as the MPPM is based on von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), it can be argued that it is not appropriate in light of 
Prospect Theory (in which investors exhibit different levels of utility towards losses and 
gains). 
To date, PMPT utilises the Sortino ratio (Sortino and Price, 1994) only. The Sortino ratio 
measures excess returns per unit of downside risk. Given the advances in finance theory and 
the intuitive appeal of PMPT, this study uses the Sortino ratio as a measure to compare 
performance of the fusion strategy against passive and active benchmarks.  
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2.3 Value investing 
There is a vast array of literature that documents the performance of shares selected on 
relative valuation multiples. The evidence points to value shares (those with low relative 
price multiples) outperforming growth shares (those with high relative price multiples). The 
most common of these multiples are the: Price to Earnings (P/E), Price to book (P/B) and 
Price to Cash Flow (P/CF) ratios. A typical strategy would be constructed as follows. First, 
data would be obtained for the relative multiple under investigation. Second, shares would be 
ranked from highest to lowest according to the multiple chosen. Third, the top grouping 
(percentile, quartile, inter alia) of shares would be termed the value portfolio, whilst the 
bottom grouping would be termed the growth portfolio.8 Value shares ranked according to 
P/E, P/B and P/CF have been shown to outperform growth shares ranked accordingly (see, 
respectively, Basu, 1977, Fama & French, 1992 and Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). 
Fama and French (1993) propose that the outperformance of value shares over growth shares, 
in effect, a value premium, is due to the inherently riskier nature of value shares relative to 
growth shares. The authors note that this premium is not captured by the standard CAPM of 
Sharpe (1964). Others, such as Black (1993) and Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) offer 
that the value premium is a result of data mining or data selection biases. There is, however, a 
third explanation offered by Lakonishok et al. (1994). The first two explanations above 
attempt to reconcile the value anomaly with the current paradigm of efficient markets. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) instead deviate from this paradigm and suggest that the value 
premium is a consequence of the judgemental mistakes of investors. This is in line with the 
earliest philosophy of value investing by Graham and Dodd (1934) – a value strategy is 
successful because it is contrary to the market. The relative valuation multiples used would 
appear to reflect the systematic errors made by investors in their forecasting. A high (low) 
P/B value may indicate that the current price of the share is inflated (deflated) relative to its 
book value. This implies that investors irrationally attribute too large (small) a weighting to 
the good (poor) performance of the firm in the recent past and assume this performance 
would continue into the near future. If (or perhaps when) the firm fails to meet investors’ 
expectations, the P/B multiple would correct itself to reflect this updating of information. 
                                                 
8
 Note that these classifications apply when the multiple has the share price as the numerator. If the share price 
were the denominator, the value portfolio would have the highest respective multiples (E/P, B/M, CF/P), 
whereas the growth portfolio would have the lowest respective multiples. 
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Relative valuation multiples can thus provide good proxies for mean reversion of shares and 
market performance.9 Further, Rousseau and van Rensburg (2004) point out that whilst the 
performance of value shares is impressive in most markets; this performance is typically 
attributed to only a handful of shares in the value portfolio. As the value of these multiples 
become extreme, there is a greater probability that the share’s price will adjust to correct for 
this, such that the multiple reverts to “acceptable levels”.  
In a South African context, Graham and Uliana (2001) find that post-1992, value shares 
outperform growth shares, whereas pre-1992, growth shares outperform value shares. Whilst 
they do not attempt to offer explanations for this anomaly, they do posit that economic and 
political conditions surrounding South Africa during this time may have impacted the results. 
Nevertheless, the findings of Graham and Uliana (2001) show that the value-growth 
phenomenon does exist in South Africa. 
The weakness of a value strategy lies in determining when this reversion will occur. A 
possible way of enhancing a value strategy would then be to delay the purchase of the value 
share until it reaches its turning point. This can be achieved via a screening criterion. Recent 
studies have suggested two distinct approaches – enhancement of a contrarian strategy with 
fundamentals or with momentum.  
2.4 Fundamental investing 
Value shares are typically neglected by both analysts and investors and thus provide an 
opportunity to investigate performance with as little market noise as possible. Arbel and 
Strebel (1982) document the neglected firm effect – the tendency of firms that are not closely 
followed by analysts to provide unexpectedly high returns. It follows that if one can correctly 
identify a share that is both neglected and inexpensive, a remarkable profit opportunity arises. 
One could conduct analysis of these firms’ financial statements, which would provide a 
reliable indicator of past performance, and the data are also readily accessible. 
 
Prior research documents that high book to market (B/M) firms outperform low B/M firms 
(see Fama & French, 1992 and Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). The success of this 
outperformance rests with a few firms that perform significantly better than most in the 
                                                 
9
 For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that the relative valuation multiple used does not provide 
any significant insight into the timing of any mean reversion (in contrast to LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
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chosen sample. It can be deduced that if an investor is able to select ex-ante, those firms that 
he judges to be superior future outperformers, the investor is able to consistently earn above 
average returns. Piotroski (2000) examines whether an accounting-based fundamental 
analysis strategy can earn positive returns for an investor. The author investigates the use of 
such a heuristic in choosing between strong and weak value firms. Application of 
fundamental analysis to accounting statements led to a successful application of a heuristic 
that discriminates between good performers and poor performers. During the sample period 
of 1976 to 1996, returns generated from this fundamental-based approached were 23% 
annually, excluding transaction costs. This also lends credence to various behavioural models 
that were developed by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999).  The effectiveness of the fundamental 
analysis strategy in Piotroski (2000) appears to be greatest in a slow information 
dissemination environment, evidence similar in line with the momentum strategy tested by 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). In these environments, value firms are typically neglected by 
analysts – hence the slow absorption of information released from those firms. Lastly, the 
author shows that the success of the strategy is based on the ability to predict future 
performance and the market’s inability to recognise these predictable patterns. When 
examining earnings announcements, returns for winner shares are 4.09% significantly higher 
than those for loser shares. This is comparable to the value versus glamour (growth) 
announcement return difference in LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
 
The performance of this strategy highlights many anomalies documented in Fama (1998). 
The ability to discriminate, ex ante, between strong and weak performers suggests that the 
market does not efficiently incorporate past information into current prices – a violation of 
weak form and semi-strong form efficiency.  
2.4.1 Prior fundamental analysis research 
2.4.1.1 The univariate approach 
LaPorta (1996) and Dechow and Sloan (1997) show that systematic errors in market 
expectations about long term earnings growth rates partially explain the success of a 
contrarian strategy (given by book-to-market values). Many investment strategies have been 
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designed and tested based on the market’s inability to fully incorporate signals of financial 
performance by firms.10  
Frankel and Lee (1998) implement a fundamental analysis approach that identifies shares 
whose prices lag their fundamental values. These undervalued shares are identified via 
earnings forecasts and accounting-based valuation models (such as a residual income model). 
Over the three year investment period analysed, this strategy is successful at generating 
significantly positive returns. Generally, analysts prefer not to follow poor performing, low 
volume or small firms (Hayes, 1998). Thus, these firms are less likely to have forecast data, a 
consequence of the neglected firm effect described earlier. This poses a significant problem 
for using Frankel and Lee’s (1998) forecast based method to select value shares. As all listed 
shares (irrespective of analyst following) are required to publish financial statements, it is 
logical to use financial statements as a basis for share analysis.  
2.4.1.2 The multivariate approach 
Holthausen and Larcker (1992) show that a statistical model can be used to accurately predict 
future excess returns. Given the complexity of these methodologies and the vast amount of 
data required, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) use 12 financial signals that are popular amongst 
analysts. These signals are shown to be correlated with contemporaneous returns after 
controlling for current earnings innovations, firm size and macroeconomic conditions. Ou 
and Penman (1989) develop such a strategy to predict future changes in earnings. This 
strategy is based on various financial ratios obtainable from historic financial statements, 
similar to the Piotroski score used in this study. Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) test the ability 
of Lev and Thiagarajan’s (1993) strategy to predict future changes in earnings and future 
revisions of analysts’ forecasts thereof.  They find that some of the signals suggested by Lev 
and Thiagarajan (1993) are economically justified in assessing future firm performance.  
 
Piotroski (2000) provides a strategy similar in spirit to Lev and Thiagarajan (1993). Whilst 
some of the signals are common to both studies, many used in Piotroski (2000) do not 
correspond to prior research. The reasons for this deviation are threefold. First, the population 
under investigation in Piotroski (2000) is restricted to value firms.11 These firms are typically 
smaller in size and often more financially distressed compared to growth firms. Thus, the 
                                                 
10
 See Piotroski (2000) for an extensive discussion. 
11
 This provides some justification for the order of the fusion strategy screens outlined in this study. 
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signals used in the Piotroski score are chosen to specifically measure profitability and default 
risk trends. Second, whilst signals such as capital expenditure decisions would be reasonably 
good indicators of financial performance, they are of secondary importance relative to the 
signals chosen to capture the health of a firm. Bernard (1994) and Sloan (1996) both show 
that accounting returns and cash flow, each relative to the other, is of importance when 
assessing future performance prospects. Third, neither Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) nor 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) offer an optimal set of signals. There is thus room for the use 
of alternative and perhaps complementary signals to demonstrate the performance of a 
fundamental analysis strategy, in general. The Piotroski score is the aggregate sum of each 
signal, once that particular signal has been reduced to binary form. By focusing only on value 
firms, the Piotroski score is able to provide a reliable gauge of financial health and 
investment potential of a value firm. Further, Piotroski (2000) postulates that if analysts 
exhibit under-reaction to financial statements – analysts are inefficient in analysing and 
interpreting financial statements – this will lend to the success of both the Piotroski score and 
momentum strategies. 
2.4.2 A contrarian strategy with fundamentals 
Piotroski (2000; 2005) demonstrated that the use of select financial ratios provides a good 
measure to differentiate between good and poor performers. Both Piotroski (2000) and Scott, 
Stumpp and Xu (2003) find that the market’s reaction is slow with respect to accounting-
based information. In the case of value shares, which have typically low expectations, any 
deviation from said expectations would plausibly create either significant profits or losses. 
This explains why publicly available information can be (profitably) used to provide medium 
term insights to the performance of (value) shares. Mohanram (2005) finds that similar 
variables used by Piotroski (2000) can be used to differentiate between good and poor 
performers.  
2.5 Momentum investing 
2.5.1 Definition and early history 
Momentum can be defined as the “continuation of the direction of prior stock returns” 
(Griffin, Ji & Martin, 2003, p. 2515). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examine the profitability 
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of a relative strength trading strategy12 (buying past winners and selling past losers) for a 
holding period that varies between three and twelve months. The findings show that 
significant profits can be made using this strategy during the sample period 1965 to 1989. 
The particular strategy examined in detail is the J=6, K=6 strategy. The evidence is 
consistent with a delayed price reaction to firm-specific information and inconsistent with the 
lead-lag effect13 of Lo and MacKinlay (1990). Further, the results are not due to the 
systematic risk of the trading strategy (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
The momentum effect was thus discovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and still remains 
an anomaly that defies traditional finance theory. In a subsequent study, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2002), the authors find that their momentum strategy continued to remain profitable. 
Rouwenhorst (1998) examines a momentum strategy in twelve European markets and finds 
its existence apparent. Chui, Titman and Wei (2000) find the effect in emerging markets and 
Fraser and Page (2000) find its persistence in the South African market. 
2.5.2 Related empirical findings 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) examine the performance of mutual funds in the 
United States. On average, those that followed a momentum strategy realised significantly 
better returns than those funds that did not. Indeed, the authors found that fund performance 
was highly correlated with a fund’s ability to implement momentum strategies and to herd. 
Intuitively, if a fund lacks the ability to time entry and exit in and out of the market, its next 
best strategy would be to follow the consensus (herd). Schierek, De Bondt and Weber (1999) 
find that both a momentum and contrarian strategy outperforms a passive approach in 
Germany during the period 1961 to 1991. As the strategies require limited trading, the 
authors submit that trading costs do not substantially alter their results. In an attempt to offer 
risk-based explanations, the authors examine factors such as share beta, standard deviation 
and firm size. None of the examined factors satisfactorily explain the persistence of profits 
under either the momentum or contrarian approach. Benson, Gallagher and Teodorowski 
(2007) examine the role of momentum in the active asset allocation environment using data 
                                                 
12
 A relative strength trading strategy is similar in concept to momentum investing. The distinction lies in the 
terminology. Positive (negative) momentum refers to the positive (negative) difference between returns. In 
contrast, positive (negative) relative trading strength refers to the positive (negative) ratio of returns.  
13
 The examination of shares sorted according to size, shows that the returns of larger shares lead the returns of 
smaller shares. Hence, the lead-lag effect.  
~ 18 ~ 
 
on Australian securities. Their results show that momentum investing does exist amongst 
Australian mutual funds and that those funds with no market timing ability are most likely to 
be momentum investors.  
2.5.3 Possible explanations of momentum 
Many academics have attempted (unsuccessfully) to explain momentum via asset pricing 
models. Fama and French (1996) resign that momentum cannot be explained by their three-
factor model in which winner shares tend to positively affect the size coefficient (given by 
SMB in the model) whereas loser shares tend to negatively affect the size coefficient. The 
extension of these effects to the long term tends to predict a reversal of returns, not a 
continuation (momentum). Thus, the model cannot explain the momentum anomaly. Conrad 
and Kaul (1998) argue that past winners have higher unconditional expected returns than past 
losers, thus these returns will not change over time and result in persistent profits. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2002) show that the method used by Conrad and Kaul (1998) is biased and those 
cross-sectional differences in expected returns explain a minute proportion of momentum 
profits. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) use a conditional asset pricing model with lagged 
macroeconomic risk factors that captures momentum in the United States reasonably well. 
These variables are related to the business cycle and show that momentum returns during an 
expansion are statistically positive whereas those during a recession are negative, albeit 
insignificant. Unfortunately, Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) show that the model by Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002) is not robust on a global level. The authors’ findings support the 
notion that macroeconomic risk, a significant contributor to momentum, is largely country 
specific. The model by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) generates inaccurate global 
momentum forecasts and is thus inadequate in explaining momentum-generated returns. 
Lastly, Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) find that momentum is not primarily driven by 
market risk (it is idiosyncratic in nature).  
Behavioural models (discussed in a Section 2.8) by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) imply that momentum and subsequent reversals should be 
stronger following market gains than market declines (as investors exhibit increased 
overconfidence and lower risk aversion during market gains). Cooper et al. (2004) find that 
these models do not stand up to empirical testing. Thus, there has been no viable explanation 
of the momentum effect to date. Hvidkjaer (2006) attempts to explain the persistence of the 
momentum effect from the perspective of trading. The intuition surrounding the explanation 
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in Hvidkjaer (2006) is as follows. If the predictions of behavioural models are uncorrelated 
across investors, trading will occur but the price effects would be minimal. However, when 
the models lead to the same conclusion, the prices will either move upwards (due to increased 
investor demand) or downwards (due to decreased investor demand). This occurs even in the 
absence of new fundamental information (Shleifer, 2000). The most pertinent link between 
cognitive biases and prices would then be the trading behaviour of investors. Hvidkjaer 
(2006) examines whether this trading behaviour is rational or irrational in nature by using 
transactions data on all NYSE/AMEX14 shares over the period 1983 to 2002. The author 
finds that large traders are less susceptible to momentum effects than small traders and 
suggests that momentum can be partially driven by the behaviour of small traders.  
2.5.4 A contrarian strategy with momentum 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985; 1987) suggest that share prices tend to overreact to information. 
A contrarian strategy (which buys past losers and sells past winners) was shown to earn 
abnormal returns over a three to five year holding period. Other strategies have used shorter 
holding periods of either days or months. Whilst these also show abnormal returns, it is 
possible that these returns can be explained by short-run price fluctuations and lack of 
liquidity. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) examine this anomaly and provide evidence in favour 
of the above interpretation. Early literature on market efficiency focused on strategies that 
bought past winners and sold past losers (for example, R. Levy, 1967)15. Grinblatt and 
Titman (1989; 1991) document that many mutual funds have a tendency to buy shares that 
have increased in price over the last quarter.  The question under review is to reconcile the 
relative strength trading strategy with the contrarian trading strategy, as both have supportive 
literature. One possible reason for the discrepancy is that the contrarian strategy utilises either 
a short term (one week or one month) or long term (three to five years) holding period 
whereas the relative strength strategy utilises a holding period between three and twelve 
months. 
 
Bird and Casavecchia (2007a) suggest that an improvement in momentum of a value share 
provides a good signal of a sustained improvement in (both fundamental and market driven) 
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 New York Stock Exchange/ American Stock Exchange 
15
 R. Levy’s (1967) results have come under heavy criticism from Jensen and Bennington (1970), by arguing 
that the different strategies were examined before developing a strategy that worked. They find that R. Levy’s 
(1967) results were prone to selection bias. 
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performance. Anecdotally, the universe of value stocks can be seen as a lemons problem16 
where cheap shares are interspersed with inexpensive shares (those that present a good 
investment opportunity). An improvement in momentum for a particular value share signals 
that the share has received increased attention, presumably brought on by an improvement in 
performance. As high momentum also indicates strong sentiment (increased popularity of the 
share leads to increased trading, driving up the share price), any decrease would be 
synonymous with the share reaching the peak of its price life cycle. Fraser and Page (2000) 
investigate the presence of both value and momentum phenomena on the JSE. They find, 
independently, that both phenomena exist. The authors find that the P/B ratio is the ideal 
indicator to use for a value strategy and a 12 month past return is the best period to use for a 
momentum strategy. 
2.6 Fusion investing 
Bird and Casavecchia (2007b) evaluate the approaches by Bird and Whitaker (2004) and 
Piotroski (2000) to enhance value style portfolios. The study focuses on European markets 
during the period 1989 to 2004.  To identify value shares, the authors use a Price to Sales 
ratio, as this was found to be the most effective in European markets. The earnings forecast 
method of Ou and Penman (1989) is used as a fundamental indicator and the specific 
momentum indicator used is an acceleration indicator. This price acceleration measure is 
analysed with the aim to synchronise the long-short strategy with market cycles. Two types 
of acceleration are defined in Bird and Casavecchia (2007b): short acceleration is calculated 
as the ratio between the three month and the six month price momentum. It is used to divide 
the bottom momentum quintile - those stocks that exhibit more losing characteristics. 
Similarly, long acceleration is calculated as the ratio between the 12-month and the 24-month 
price momentum. It is used to divide the top momentum quintile - those stocks that exhibit 
more winning characteristics. Further, they find that both enhancements (momentum and 
fundamentals), independently and in combination, improve the timing ability of the manager 
in selecting value and growth stocks and that the momentum enhancement subsumes the 
fundamental enhancement in better identifying value shares. Specifically, the success rate of 
enhancing a value style with a momentum indicator increases from 42% to 53% over a one 
                                                 
16
 Akerlof (1970) describes the market for lemons as the information asymmetry that exists when the seller 
knows more about the product than the buyer. Here, “lemon” refers to a defective product.  
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year holding period. Thus, Bird and Casavecchia (2007b) provide evidence of the success of 
the fusion strategy (without using that particular terminology) in European markets. 
The sorting and ranking procedure in Bird and Casavecchia (2007b) differs from that used in 
this study. The authors first sort shares into value and growth groupings and thereafter 
simultaneously sorts these shares according to fundamentals and momentum; with each sort 
conducted on an annual basis. Further, the acceleration measure used by the authors is not 
used in this study, primarily due to data constraints.  
2.7 The role of stochastic dominance in empirical finance 
Decision theory is concerned with identifying values and uncertainties in a given decision 
that result in the optimal outcome (Wald, 1939). It is one of the core aspects of any financial 
or investment decision. Traditional finance theory, beginning with MPT, assumes that 
investors are rational at every point in time (Markowitz, 1959). Further, in this framework, 
the investor’s utility is a function of wealth which is non-decreasing ( ≥  0) and 
exhibits diminishing marginal utility ( <  0) – in other words, the investor is risk-
averse. However, based on the works of Friedman and Savage (1948), Markowitz (1952a) 
and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), prospect theory was developed as a contender to the 
traditional framework. Friedman and Savage (1948) provide a hypothesis which includes the 
traditional axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as well as a theoretical 
justification for a section of the utility function to be convex – a section which exhibits 
increasing marginal utility ( >  0). Markowitz (1952a) in an attempt to refine the work 
of Friedman and Savage (1948) adds that investors possess a utility function which consists 
of two concave and two convex segments. Using this theoretical foundation, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) find experimental evidence that supports the notion of the utility function 
described previously and formalise the concept of Prospect Theory. The authors conclude 
that investors maximise the expected value of the function for the convex segment for 
negative outcomes and the concave segment for positive outcomes. The evolution of utility 
functions is presented in Figure 2 below. The left-most function corresponds to that used in 
Markowitz (1959), the middle-left to that used in Friedman and Savage (1948), the middle-
right to that used in Markowitz (1952a) and the right-most to that used in Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). 
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Figure 2 – Evolution of utility functions (Lopes, 1987).  
Under the original methodology of Prospect Theory, investors would overweight unlikely 
events independently of their relative outcomes. This would lead decision makers to choose 
the worst of two options based on their cumulative probability distributions. Thus the theory 
as presented in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) gave rise to violations of first order stochastic 
dominance which presumes an expected utility maximiser possesses an increasing utility 
function – in other words, the decision maker would instead choose the better of two options 
based on their cumulative probability distributions. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) thus 
developed a variant of the original theory, referred to as Cumulative Prospect Theory. Under 
this variant, cumulative probabilities are transformed to weighted cumulative probabilities, 
shown in Figure 3 below. This leads extreme events of small probability to be appropriately 
weighted as opposed to equally weighting all extreme events of small probability (as per the 
original Prospect Theory). This ensured that first order stochastic dominance was not 
violated.  
 
Figure 3 – A weighting function used in Cumulative Prospect Theory 
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The main development of SD theory was due to Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy 
(1969), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and Whitmore (1970).17 Hadar and Russell (1969) 
develop theorems for ordering uncertain prospects related to first and second order stochastic 
dominance. Hanoch and Levy (1969) present a framework for incorporating SD to portfolio 
selection and optimisation. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) view financial returns as a random 
variable and attempt to model portfolio selection based on this precept and SD rules. 
Whitmore (1970) develops criterion for third degree dominance and its inclusion in the field 
of utility theory. Since these developments, application of SD rules to finance, statistics and 
empirical data have been successful (see H. Levy, 1992).  
The primary advantage of SD theory in finance over MPT is that SD theory is based on an 
axiomatic model of risk-averse preferences. The MPT model of mean-variance optimisation 
does not model the entire spectrum of risk-averse preferences. Moreover, as discussed 
previously, the use of standard deviation as a measure of risk is not an accurate description of 
an investor’s attitude towards risk. Porter (1974) shows that the use of semi-variance as a 
measure of risk is consistent with the rules of SD theory. Thus, there exists a relationship 
between the use of SD rules, semi-variance as a measure of risk and concepts from 
behavioural finance.  
2.8 Explanations from behavioural finance 
The existence and persistence of momentum and value strategies go against the literature on 
market efficiency. Proponents of behavioural finance have associated the persistence of these 
market anomalies to cognitive biases of investors. Frank (2004) presents experimental 
evidence of over- and under- reaction on the JSE. The results show that the markets will 
under-react to reliable information and over-react to unreliable information. 
2.8.1 A behavioural framework for investing 
The classification of objects into categories based on some similarity among them is one of 
the foundations of human thought (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). In the financial environment, 
investors (or portfolio managers) classify assets into broad categories such as large-cap 
shares, government bonds, venture capital, inter alia and thereafter decide how much of 
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 Since the development of Prospect Theory, there has been subsequent development into Prospect Stochastic 
Dominance (Linton, Massoumi & Whang, 2005). However, application of this technique is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
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capital to invest in each class (R. Bernstein, 1995). The process of allocating capital into such 
categories has become known as style investing.  
 
Intuitively, assets that belong to the same style will inherently share some base characteristic. 
As such the impact of an exogenous event will affect the entire portfolio either positively or 
negatively. In Modern Portfolio Theory terminology, the portfolio does not have a high level 
of diversification, which can be captured by the high correlation and covariance amongst the 
portfolio constituents. The driving force behind the initiation of new styles and the ending of 
old styles is largely due to financial innovation and sentiment (or popularity). For example, in 
the years following 2003, the Credit Default Swap (CDS) has gained in popularity. 
Consequently, a new style of investing would be to allocate greater proportions of capital to a 
CDS. Similarly, following the works of Banz (1979) and Basu (1977), small stocks would 
have increased in popularity.  
 
Style investing is pleasing to both individual and institutional investors for two reasons. First, 
the categorisation of assets significantly reduces the amount of time and effort required to 
process information efficiently (Mullainathan, 2000). For example, an investor would prefer 
to allocate capital amongst say, five asset styles, as opposed to across every listed security. 
Second, by segmenting assets, performance evaluation is simplified, especially when peer 
group comparisons are used (Sharpe, 1992). From an institutional perspective, style investing 
provides a great benefit to funds that are required to follow a mandate.  
 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) present a simple model for an assessment of style investing. 
Under the assumption that investors follow a momentum strategy, they find that the 
investment styles follow a specific life cycle. Prices deviate from their fundamental values as 
styles become popular or unpopular. According to the authors, in an inefficient market, an 
arbitrageur can earn substantial profits by following a combination of a momentum and 
contrarian strategy.  However, with extremely volatile prices, the popularity of a particular 
style is sometimes clouded. Thus, arbitrage becomes risky and consistent profits are less 
likely to be realised. Consistent with this implication, one can also conclude that these results 
imply an efficient market in that arbitrage activity decreases consistent profits to the point of 
eliminating them - prices thereby reflect their fundamental values. Barberis and Shleifer 
(2003) are particularly careful in using such terms and simply present stylised facts of their 
study, without overemphasising the importance of their results. One can also relate their 
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results to the AMH described earlier. As the AMH offers a cyclical view of efficiency, one 
could infer that the popularity (and performance) of a particular style will follow a cyclical 
pattern. 
2.8.2 The over- and under- reaction hypotheses 
The phenomena of over- and under- reaction are well documented in the literature. The over-
reaction hypothesis of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) suggests that investors overweight current 
(or short term) information and underweight historic (or long term) information. Thus, 
investors can cause prices to overshoot fundamental values. Hence, over-reaction leads past 
losers to become underpriced and past winners to become overpriced, leading to a reversal in 
the future. This hypothesis is tested by the authors who find that the reaction is more severe 
for loser shares than winner shares and more apparent over longer term horizons of between 
three to five years. Further, a strategy which bought loser shares outperformed winner shares 
by 24.6% over three years, excluding costs. This strategy has grown to become known as 
value (or contrarian) investing, which was discussed earlier.  
Page and Way (1992) document over-reaction on the JSE. The authors found that loser shares 
outperformed winner shares by 14.5% over a three year holding period, excluding costs. This 
implied that the JSE was weak-form inefficient. However, in both De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) and Page and Way (1992), returns were found to be seasonal during January (although 
Page & Way, 1992, found that it is less pronounced). Muller (1999) also tests for over-
reaction on the JSE but restricts the analysis to the 200 largest shares, given by market 
capitalisation over the period 1985 to 1998. By adopting a methodology which overcame the 
seasonality effect of other studies, the author confirmed the presence of over-reaction on the 
JSE. In a more recent study, Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) confirm the previous findings of Page 
and Way (1992) that share prices on the JSE tend to overshoot their fundamentals and mean 
revert. The authors also find that the correction back to fundamentals is stronger for loser 
shares than winner shares – as found in De Bondt and Thaler (1985).  
In contrast, the under-reaction hypothesis as explained by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) states that prices are gradually updated to reflect new information. Specifically, shares 
initially under-react to good news, which is corrected at a later stage, and at that later stage 
the returns of shares which released good news are higher than those that released bad news.  
As a consequence, these prices exhibit positive autocorrelation over short-term horizons of 
approximately 12 months. Studies such as Bernard and Thomas (1989; 1990) and Ikenberry, 
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Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) show that prices are slow to react to earnings 
announcements and share repurchases, respectively. If one were to profit from the under-
reaction hypothesis, it follows that firms that release good news should be bought and those 
that release bad news should be sold. This has manifested itself in the form of fundamental 
investing described earlier. Using fundamental analysis, the investor is able to determine the 
impact of news releases. The need for timing the market has been addressed via momentum 
strategies. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that abnormal positive returns generated 
by their momentum strategies disappear after two years. This implies that the market has 
fully incorporated the historic information into share prices – the market has achieved a level 
of efficiency.  
Both these phenomena pose a challenge to efficient markets as sophisticated investors can 
earn superior returns by utilising these concepts. Indeed, the literature presented forms a 
justifiable response to the order of the screening criteria of the fusion strategy.18 Fama and 
French (1996) posit that their three-factor model can account for over-reaction but not under-
reaction. Loser shares have positive size (SMB) and value (HML) slopes and thus have higher 
average future returns whereas winner shares have negative value (HML) slopes and thus 
have lower average future returns. The differing signs between loser and winner shares imply 
a long term reversal. Barberis et al. (1998) develop a parsimonious model of investor 
sentiment - one that incorporates both over-reaction and under-reaction. Their model is 
consistent with the experimental evidence of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), with respect to 
representativeness and conservatism bias (both described below). Under an environment of a 
single asset and single investor, the earnings of the asset follow a random walk. The investor, 
who is unaware of this, believes that earnings moves between two states. In the first, earnings 
are mean reverting. In the second, they follow a trend. The transition probabilities between 
states, as well as the statistical properties, are fixed in the investor’s mind. Each period, the 
investor updates his information based on an observation of earnings. Although the investor’s 
model of earnings is inaccurate, this updating process is Bayesian19 in nature. Barberis et al. 
(1998) show that for a plausible range of values, this model works well in generating 
                                                 
18
 Alternatively, the incorporation of these all particular screens may be counter-productive to producing 
superior returns.  
19
 Bayesian statistics interpret and measure probability objectively or subjectively. Both require the assumptions 
of rationality and consistency, albeit by differing degrees (Bayes & Price, 1763). 
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predictions observed in the data. In other words, the authors find that investors over-react to 
negative news and under-react to positive news. 
2.8.2.1 Psychological evidence 
Conservatism states that individuals are slow to change their beliefs in the face of new 
evidence (Edwards, 1968). In experiments conducted by the author, the subjects’ reactions 
are benchmarked to that of an idealised rational Bayesian investor. The findings show that 
individuals do update their beliefs, but by a lower magnitude, relative to the rational Bayesian 
benchmark. Subjects take between “two to five observations to do one observation’s worth of 
work in inducing a subject to change his opinions” (Edwards, 1968, p. 359). 
The evidence on conservatism suggests that, in a financial context, under-reaction could be 
present. Investors might disregard the full information content of, say, an earnings 
announcement. As a consequence, revaluation of the share will only partially reflect the full 
impact of the announcement. Investors tend to underweight useful evidence relative to less 
useful evidence that they obtained a priori. Further, they might exhibit overconfidence in 
their revaluations (Barberis et al., 1998). 
 
The second relevant phenomenon documented by psychologists is the representativeness 
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). A person who follows this heuristic will evaluate 
probabilities based on its similarity to other events and in a manner which reflects the salient 
features of the process that generated it. An important consequence of the heuristic, as 
discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is that people (investors) will perceive to 
observe patterns in truly random sequences. As conservatism is suggestive of under-reaction, 
representativeness is suggestive of over-reaction. To continue with the example of earnings 
announcements, a consistent history of unusually positive announcements will lead investors 
to believe that this past history is predictive of future performance. They would thus 
disregard the pertinent fact of these high earning firms not being able to repeat this 
performance in the future. When the expected earnings growth is not realised, investors 
penalise the firm by means of a drop in share price. 
 
Griffin and Tversky (1992) attempt to reconcile conservatism with representativeness. They 
find that when people focus too much on the strength of the evidence and too little on its 
weight, forecasts are usually revised downwards – an observance of conservatism. 
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Conversely, when too much focus is given on weight and not enough on strength, over-
reaction occurs. In the world of finance, investors might underweight the information 
contained in quarterly earnings announcements, since a single number cannot contain much 
information. They ignore the weight that the news has on forecasting future earnings. 
Alternatively, investors can overweight the information content of consistently high or low 
earnings growth, not realising the low impact this has on forecasting.  
 
It is important to note that the psychological evidence does not indicate how to quantitatively 
differentiate between information that leads to over-reaction and information that leads to 
under-reaction. Thus, any consecutive finance related literature is not per se based on 
psychological evidence as opposed to being motivated by it. Studies conducted on simulated 
financial experiments (such as that by Andreassen & Kraus, 1990 and De Bondt, 1993) show 
that these two phenomena of over- and under- reaction do exist.  
2.8.3 The overconfident investor 
Daniel et al. (1998) present a behavioural model similar to that of Barberis et al. (1998), with 
a different psychological foundation. The model by Daniel et al. (1998) is based on 
overconfidence and biased self-attribution20. They define an overconfident investor as one 
who is quasi-rational – the investor is a Bayesian optimiser except for his over-assessment of 
valid private information, but not of publicly received information, and his biased updating of 
this precision. Further, when investors observe the outcomes of their actions, they update 
their confidence in their own ability in a biased manner. According to Attribution Theory 
(Heider, 1958), individuals strongly attribute events that confirm the validity of their actions 
to high ability and those that negate their actions to external noise or sabotage.21 The authors 
find that share prices over-react to private information and under-react to public information.  
2.8.4 A unified theory of over- and under- reaction 
Hong and Stein (1999) follow in the spirit of Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998) in 
developing a behavioural model. They place considerably more emphasis on the interaction 
of heterogeneous agents and less on the psychology of said agents. Their model features two 
types of agents – news watchers and momentum traders, both of which are boundedly 
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 Also referred to as self-serving bias, this is the tendency of people to attribute their success to endogenous 
factors and failures to exogenous factors (Miller & Ross, 1975). 
21
 Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1956). 
~ 29 ~ 
 
rational.22 News watchers make forecasts based on some subset of publicly available 
information and do not condition forecasts on current or past prices. Momentum traders, 
however, do condition forecasts on past prices. Hong and Stein (1999) impose the assumption 
that the forecasts by momentum traders are simple in nature – in other words, they are 
univariate functions. Further, the authors assume that private information diffuses gradually 
amongst the news watcher population (a violation of market efficiency). Hong and Stein 
(1999) show that when only news watchers are active, prices adjust slowly to new 
information, more specifically, there is only under-reaction and never over-reaction. When 
momentum traders are added to the model, the initial reaction of prices is accelerated but at 
the expense of creating eventual over-reaction.  
 
The model presented by Hong and Stein (1999) unifies the under- and over-reaction 
hypotheses by showing that the presence of under-reaction creates the need for over-reaction 
and vice versa. If one group of traders under-react to private information, a second group of 
traders tries to exploit this under-reaction via an arbitrage strategy. Whilst they partially 
eliminate the under-reaction, they create excessive price momentum in the process that 
eventually culminates into over-reaction.  
2.9 Summary 
This chapter has covered various aspects of finance literature – some of which seem 
unrelated. However, under closer examination, it is found that these aspects are intertwined. 
An overview of the literature on market efficiency led to an alternative hypothesis (the AMH) 
as well as the use of semi-deviation and the Sortino ratio as a more appropriate measure of 
risk and performance, respectively (both from a statistical and psychological perspective). 
The anomalies of value investing, fundamental investing and momentum investing were then 
investigated from an empirical perspective and from the perspective of behavioural finance. 
Indeed, these anomalies can be seen to have roots in the over- and under- reaction 
hypotheses. Further, an alternative statistical technique was explored in testing financial 
series. Stochastic dominance seems a good fit to the challenges presented in the literature 
surrounding the traditional finance framework of examining risk and returns.   
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 In decision making, an individual’s rationality is limited by the information available, the cognitive 
limitations of his mind, and the finite amount of time available to make the decision. The phrase was first 
introduced by Simon (1957). 
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3 Data and Methodology 
This chapter proceeds with a description of the data and sample used, followed by an outline 
of the methodology. From the current literature, a fusion strategy begins with selecting those 
shares that show value characteristics. These shares are then screened using various filters to 
select those that show the greatest profit potential. A typical value strategy will be discussed 
followed by the various screens. It should be noted that value investing can (and has) been 
enhanced by each of the screens discussed (albeit independently), to earn superior profits. It is 
logical to assess the performance of sequential screening, thereby creating a fusion strategy.  
3.1 Data  
Data was obtained from FinData@Wits23, I-Net and McGregor BFA. The data consisted of 
B/M ratios, fundamental (financial statement) data and monthly closing prices for all firms 
that were listed and subsequently delisted on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange Ltd. 
(JSE) during the period January 1989 to December 2010.  It is crucial to note that the 
inclusion of delisted firms is done to prevent any look-ahead bias. Whilst this may seem 
counterintuitive, the following scenario is assumed to hold. At a point in time, the investor (or 
portfolio manager) has access to public information regarding those firms currently listed. 
Based on this dynamic sample, he makes his selection of shares via the fusion strategy. Thus, 
he does not know in advance which shares will be either suspended or delisted. Once the 
portfolio is formed, should delisting or suspension occur, the share is immediately removed 
from the portfolio and assigned a zero percentage return. Data for unit trusts were also 
collected from McGregor BFA. As bid and offer prices on these unit trusts were unavailable, 
closing prices are used in all comparisons.  
3.2 Value investing 
All value strategies select those shares that have low fundamentals relative to price. The 
shares are then sorted and grouped in descending order. This study uses book-to-market 
(B/M) ratios as the value indicator as Auret and Sinclaire (2006) find this proxy to be a 
highly significant variable in identifying value shares listed on the JSE. From the sample, 
those firms with negative B/M ratios24 were excluded. Thus, each financial year, all shares 
that qualified (had a non-negative B/M ratio) were ranked and sorted into quartiles according 
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 FinData@Wits is a database compiled internally by the University of the Witwatersrand.  
24
 A share can have a negative B/M ratio if the firm has experienced a series of financial losses. 
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to their B/M values. At the point of forming the portfolio, the B/M value that applies to the 
previous financial year end would be used. For example, if a firm has a B/M value of 1.5 
during its 1995 financial year end, this value will be used in the ranking for the 1996 financial 
year end. It is important to note that each share (more specifically the firm) would have 
differing financial year ends. At the end of each firm’s financial year end, new B/M values 
are used in ranking shares. Using prior year distributions to create the value portfolios 
eliminates look ahead bias; however, this methodology also leads to larger (smaller) samples 
of value firms in years where the overall market declines (rises). Piotroski (2000) finds that 
these time-specific patterns do not affect the results. 
3.3 Fundamental investing 
Fama and French (1995) identify that the average high B/M (value) firm is financially 
distressed. By simply implementing a value strategy, one cannot easily distinguish between 
those firms that are financially sound from those that are not. Typically, firms that are 
financially distressed are associated with declining or persistently low margins of profits, 
cash flows and liquidity. If one can identify which firms are in financial distress (or near 
approaching financial distress), one can then filter out those that are unsound from those that 
are sound. In this spirit, fundamental investing was developed.  
The Piotroski score (Piotroski, 2000) relies on examining historical financial statement 
information to filter out financially sound firms from their counterparts. The variables are 
then converted to binary signals – if the firm’s ratio surpasses the benchmark, it takes on a 
value of either 0 or 1 (dependent upon the variable in question). The binary signals are then 
aggregated. The aggregate score ranges from 0 to 9 where 0 indicates a financially unsound 
firm and 9 indicates a financially sound firm. The fundamental signals chosen are related to: 
profitability, financial leverage, liquidity and operating efficiency.  Piotroski (2000) stresses 
that these signals were chosen from both academic and practitioner circles and that they do 
not purport to represent the only signals to indicate the financial soundness of a firm.25 
Whilst this approach seems relatively efficient, the effect of any signal on the share’s price 
may be ambiguous. Therefore, an ex ante implication must be stated. Each signal is 
conditioned on the premise that the firm is financially distressed to some degree. Myers and 
                                                 
25
 Various statistical methodologies, such as factor analysis, can be used to determine the optimal choice of 
signals to be used. 
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Majluf (1984) describe how an increase in leverage can be considered a negative signal 
whereas Harris and Raviv (1990) find that an increase in leverage can be considered a 
positive signal. Thus, the extent of these signals may not be uniform across firms with high 
B/M values. This ultimately will reduce the power of the Piotroski score to differentiate 
between financially sound and financially unsound firms. 
Each of the signals will now be discussed followed by the composite score.  
3.3.1 Profitability 
The profitability of a firm provides information about the firm’s ability to generate funds 
internally. A positive earnings trend suggests an improvement of the firm’s ability to generate 
cash in the future. Similarly, a negative earnings trend is suggestive of future performance 
deterioration. 
The Piotroski score uses four performance measures on profitability: 
1. ROA: The return on assets of a firm, defined as net income before extraordinary items as a 
percentage of average assets for the year. 
2. CFO: Cash flow from operations as a percentage of average assets for the year. 
3. ∆ROA: The difference between the current year’s ROA and the previous year’s ROA.  
If ROA, CFO and ∆ROA are positive, their respective dummy variables take on a value of 1, 
and 0 otherwise. The benchmarks of zero profit and zero cash flow were chosen by Piotroski 
(2000) as they are independent of industry level, market level and time specification.26 Sloan 
(1996) finds that firms that have positive accrual adjustments (profits that are greater than 
cash flow from operations) actually convey a negative signal to investors, whereas a negative 
accrual adjustment conveys a positive signal. This result could have possibly gained credence 
from the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis of Jensen (1986). Amongst value firms (firms with high 
B/M values) this relationship becomes important in managing earnings, where the incentive 
to do so is strong (Sweeney, 1994). As such, the relationship between cash flow and earnings 
is considered.   
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 Zero profit or zero cash flow can occur at any point in time, irrespective of industry-wide profit levels or 
market-wide profit levels. These benchmarks are thus independent and also easy to implement. 
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4. Accrual27: The variable Accrual is defined as the current year’s net income less 
extraordinary items and less cash flow from operations as a percentage of average assets for 
the year. The associated dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 if Accrual is positive (CFO 
> ROA) and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.2 Leverage, liquidity and source of funds 
Since most value firms are financially constrained, it is logical to examine their capital 
structure and ability to meet future obligations. Further if these financially constrained firms 
were to increase leverage via external financing or decreasing liquidity, it has a negative 
impact on the firm’s management of financial risk (financial risk is thus greater). 
1. ∆Lever captures changes in long term capital structure. It is the change in the historical 
ratio of long term debt to average total assets. An increase in the ratio is seen as a negative 
signal. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985) argue that the use of external 
financing conveys a signal that the firm is unable to generate sufficient internal funds. An 
increase in long term debt is also likely to place further constraints on the firm’s financial 
flexibility. Thus, the associated dummy variable takes on a value of 1, if ∆Lever is negative 
and 0 otherwise. 
2. ∆Liquid measures the change in liquidity. It is defined as the difference between the 
current year’s current ratio (current assets as a percentage of current liabilities) to the 
previous year’s current ratio. A positive change implies a positive signal and consequently 
has a value of 1 for the dummy variable. A negative change has a value of 0 for the dummy 
variable. 
3. Eq_offer is simply a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the firm did not issue 
equity in the prior year and 0 otherwise. As discussed in Myers and Majluf (1984), the use of 
external financing (debt, hybrid securities or common equity) signals a firm’s inability to 
generate sufficient cash flow to meet obligations.  
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 Piotroski’s (2000) definition of accrual includes depreciation, where depreciation is considered a negative 
accrual.  
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3.3.3 Operating efficiency 
The last two measures used are components included in a DuPont model.28  
1. ∆Margin is defined as the firm’s current gross margin ratio (gross margin as a percentage 
of total sales) less the prior year’s gross margin ratio. If the associated change is positive, the 
dummy variable takes on a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. The associated positive change could 
indicate an increase in the firm’s product price or a decrease in operating or input costs. 
2. ∆Turn is defined as the firm’s current year’s asset turnover ratio (total sales as a percentage 
of average total assets for the year) less the prior year’s asset turnover ratio. An improvement 
in this ratio signifies greater productivity of assets and has a value of 1 for the dummy 
variable; and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.4  Composite score 
Thus, the nine dummy variables in equation form are: 
 FScore=FROA+ F∆ROA+FCFO+ FACCRUAL+ F∆MARGIN+ F∆TURN+ F∆LEVER+F∆LIQUID+ EQOFFER {2} 
A fundamental investment strategy will rely on selecting firms with high F_Scores. This 
differs from the probability models and data fitting models of Ou and Penman (1989) and 
Holthausen and Larcker (1992). The Piotroski Score is straightforward to implement and can 
be recalculated with little effort. 
As the F_Score is an aggregate measure of performance, it presents a simplified investment 
strategy when using fundamentals. However, given this simplicity, two complications arise. 
First, the conversion of information into binary signals does ultimately lead to a loss of that 
information. Thus, potentially valuable information can be overlooked. Second, there is no 
theoretical justification for the above model. It is an ad hoc approach to selecting those firms 
that are fundamentally stable.29 
Once the Piotroski scores are calculated, those firms that have scores greater than or equal to 
7 are selected to implement a momentum strategy. It is hypothesised that these firms will 
                                                 
28
 The Du Pont model deconstructs return on equity into three components – financial leverage, operating 
efficiency and asset use efficiency. The model was introduced by the Du Pont Corporation in 1920. 
29
 Alternative measures would be the use of Altman’s z-statistic (Altman, 1968), the historical change in 
profitability or a decomposition of ROA.  
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have strong subsequent performance. The choice of the cut-off score represents the highest 
tercile of firms – in other words, the top 33% of value firms. Thus, out of the sub-population 
of value firms (some of which may be financially distressed) the Piotroski score selects those 
which possess strong historical financial soundness.   
3.4 Momentum investing 
Momentum investing has received much attention from finance academics and practitioners 
since the seminal work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Momentum strategies can be used 
for almost any tradable security and can be implemented on either prices (returns) or earnings 
announcements (see Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). Not surprisingly, many trading platforms 
now provide momentum indicators in trading charts to assist those who wish to follow this 
strategy. This study follows the “traditional” approach – namely using share returns to base a 
buy or sell decision without the use of trading charts. 
Using those shares that pass both of the above screening criteria (the value screen and 
Piotroski screen), a momentum strategy is implemented. This study uses a J=12, K=12 
momentum strategy. Fraser and Page (2000) find that 12 month past returns provide the 
highest returns for a momentum strategy. Further, for a typical investor, a holding period of 
12 months is appropriate. The original approach is described as per Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). Historic share returns are calculated each month for a 12 month horizon – in other 
words, on a rolling 12 month horizon. The shares are then sorted based on these historic 
returns, in ascending order, into quintiles. The bottom quintile is referred to as the loser 
portfolio and the top quintile is referred to as the winner portfolio. Typically one would long 
the top quintile and short the bottom quintile. However, this study only utilises the long 
strategy. Given that historic 12 month returns are calculated monthly, the sorting procedure is 
also conducted monthly. Thus, each month the top quintile is bought. Returns to buying the 
top quintile are calculated 12 months later (effectively creating a buy-and-hold strategy). As 
the portfolio in month t is held for a period of 12 months, the overall portfolio will consist of 
the winner portfolio for the current month, as well as the winner portfolios for the previous 
11 months – the overall portfolio will consist of 12 buy-and-hold returns. The return of this 
overall portfolio is the equally weighted average of the monthly winner portfolios (the 
arithmetic average of the twelve 12 month buy-and-hold returns). Adherence to differing 
financial year ends leads to a tedious check each month to determine if the correct shares are 
evaluated (as the share will have a different B/M and Piotroski score each financial year). 
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It can be deduced that the longer the holding period, the lower the transaction costs. 
However, the drawback with extending the holding period is that opportunities to rebalance 
the portfolio (especially in a volatile market) will be missed. It then becomes a typical 
economic conundrum of weighing the (transaction) costs with the benefit of realising 
(potentially) greater returns.    
3.5 Statistical methodology 
Stochastic Dominance (SD) refers to set of relations which hold between two distributions, 
characterised by their Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs). Consider the CDFs of two 
functions, A and B.  If for any argument (or point), x, CDFA(x) ≥ CDFB(x), then B is said to 
stochastically dominate A. At first, the conclusion appears counterintuitive. It is important to 
note that CDF(x) represents the proportion of all observations that lie below x – in other 
words, the area under the curve with a vertical asymptote at x. Thus, the CDF which has the 
greater area under the curve up to and including x has a greater proportion of observations 
that lie below x. This can be further illustrated if x is considered to represent a level of return. 
If any return below x is considered to be below the minimum acceptable return, then, 
according to the above relation, A will have a greater proportion of returns that are below the 
minimum acceptable level. Thus A is dominated by B at first order.  
The use of SD in finance circumvents the investigation of distributional properties and yet 
still presents utility-based interpretations that are economically justifiable. As it is beyond the 
scope of this study to specify the utility function of the investor who follows the fusion 
strategy, it is found that 
...in the absence of any specification of the utility function, to say that prospect P is larger 
than P’ in the sense of first order dominance is equivalent to saying that P is preferred to P’ 
for all monotonic utility functions; and given risk aversion, to say that P is larger than P’ in 
the sense of second order dominance is equivalent to saying that P is preferred to P’ for all 
concave utility functions (Hadar & Russell, 1969, p. 34).  
Fong, Wong and Lean (2005) are the first to use SD to analyse a momentum strategy. Their 
primary focus is on the higher orders of SD, due to the compelling utility interpretations these 
orders contribute. The first three orders of stochastic dominance each have a different 
interpretation of the utility function of the investor. As such, the concept of proper risk 
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aversion (the precept of first order dominance) and then the higher orders of SD will now be 
discussed. 
3.5.1 Proper risk aversion 
“Proper risk aversion is the property that an undesirable lottery can never become desirable by the 
presence of an independent undesirable lottery” (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987). Thus, if an investor 
is forced to choose between two undesirable outcomes, the outcome not chosen should still 
remain undesirable, independent of his level of wealth. 
 
Utility functions that are monotone obey the above definition. Examples of monotone utility 
functions include the power and concave exponential utility functions. Consider the following 
utility function:  
  =   [ −  !"#]$%&'  
{3} 
Where g is an arbitrary function of any non-decreasing value of s, F is non-decreasing and 
 !"#can be replaced by w when s=0. This monotone utility function can be expressed as:  
  = ( +  [ !"#* −  !"#]$%&'  
{4} 
for any w1, where U(w1) is finite. After differentiating with respect to w and applying Bernstein’s 
Theorem (S. Bernstein, 1928), the following expressions are obtained: 
 + > 0 ,-. /00 1 ≥ 1 /1$ 1 -$$          {5} 
 
 + < 0 ,-. /00 1 ≥ 1 /1$ 1  3 1 {6} 
In other words, the above expressions imply that investors prefer more positively skewed 
return distributions.  
3.5.2 Orders of stochastic dominance 
Orders of stochastic dominance can be defined as follows: 
 Ds+16=  Dszdz, for s=1,2,3,…
?
0
 
{7} 
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where Ds+1(x) represents a CDF of order s+1. If a distribution dominates another at first 
order, then it is sufficient (yet not necessary)30 to infer that it will dominate that distribution 
for any successive order.   Definitions are now offered for first, second and third order SD. 
Definition 1: First order stochastic dominance (FSD) 
Let F and G be the cumulative distributions of two risky assets, x be the uncertain31 return 
and U be the utility function. Further, assume that all investors are non-satiated (6 ≥ 0). 
F is said to dominate G at first order if: 
 %6 ≤ A6,-. /00 6 {8} 
If the investor picks the asset whose returns are given by G, there is a higher probability he 
will earn lower returns than if he were to pick the asset whose returns are given by F. In 
realistic scenarios, FSD is a stringent criterion to rely upon as it does not describe the risk 
appetite of the investor – only that the investor prefers more wealth to less wealth. In Figure 4 
below, option A dominates option B as A has a smaller area under its curve.  
 
Figure 4 – First order stochastic dominance 
 
 
                                                 
30
 A sufficient condition, if satisfied, assures the validity of the statement. In contrast, a necessary condition 
must be satisfied to assure the validity of the statement. 
31
 Uncertainty refers to both an unknown outcome, x, and an unknown distribution of x. This is in contrast to 
risk which refers to an unknown outcome x with a known distribution of x (Knight, 1921). One could argue 
that financial returns have log-normal distributions but there is no prevailing consensus on this point (see 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997).  
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Definition 2: Second order stochastic dominance (SSD) 
Let F and G be defined as above for Definition 1. Then, F is said to dominate G at second 
order for all investors with utility functions satisfying 6 ≥ 0 and 6 ≤ 0 if:  
  [AB −  %B]?!& $B ≥ 0 ,-. /00 6 
{9} 
SSD applies to investors who are non-satiated and risk-averse.  In Figure 5 below, option A has 
second order dominance over option B as function D(z) is positive for all x. However, option A 
does not have first order dominance over option B as A has a larger area under its curve.  
 
Figure 5 – Second order stochastic dominance 
 
Definition 3: Third order stochastic dominance (TSD) 
Let F and G be defined as above for Definition 1. Then, F is said to dominate G at third order 
for all investors with utility functions satisfying 6 ≥ 0, 6 ≤ 0 and 6 ≥ 0 if: 
mF > mG and   
   [AB −  %B]C!& $B$3
?
!&  ≥ 0 ,-. /00 6 
{10} 
where m denotes expected return. For an investor who is non-satiated, risk-averse and has a 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, third order SD provides the criterion for ranking returns.  
3.5.3 The link to mean-variance analysis 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the use of standard deviation as measure of risk is tenuous at best. 
However, in two particular scenarios, the use of standard deviation is acceptable – when returns 
are normally distributed or when investors have quadratic utility functions. SD analysis relaxes 
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these assumptions and provides a more general framework for analysing the risk-return 
framework. Similar to mean-variance analysis, SD analysis provides a means of ranking 
portfolios but within a less restrictive framework. 
3.5.4 Methods of analysing performance 
3.5.4.1 Stochastic dominance tests 
Tests for stochastic dominance are non-parametric (there is no fixed structure of the model 
used), make no assumptions about the distribution of asset returns and minimal assumptions 
on investor utility (namely, that the investor prefer more wealth to less). However, it is quite 
sensitive to outliers in the distribution. The use of stochastic dominance testing allows for 
variation in the screening protocol. The order of the screens can then be changed to determine 
if a particular order performs better than another. However, this avenue is left for future 
research.  
Linton, Massoumi and Whang (2005) present a generalised procedure for estimating first and 
second order dominance where observations are allowed to be autocorrelated and there is 
dependence amongst observations.32 These relaxations of the independence and identical 
observations assumptions fit well when returns of different funds are compared in the same 
market.  
The authors offer a procedure for estimation that consists of finding at least one observation 
that results in a strictly positive value. In other words, it searches for that observation which 
results in the smallest positive area between two graphs. The estimation procedure for first 
and second order dominance, respectively, is given by: 
 $∗ = min max[AB −  %B] {11} 
 ∗ = min max [AH −  %H]$H
I
!&
 
{12} 
As such, the hypotheses to be tested are: 
1. J'K: d* ≤ 0  against J(K: d* > 0 
2. J'": s* ≤ 0 against J(": s* > 0 
The first hypothesis tests for first order dominance, whilst the second tests for higher order 
dominance. The critical values for these distributions are obtained via a sub-sampling 
                                                 
32
 Another common alternative is the test offered by Davidson and Duclous (2000), described in Appendix A. 
~ 41 ~ 
 
approach. The results obtained from these smaller samples construct the distribution of 
possible values for d* and s*. Thereafter, using the entire sample, one determines if these 
values lie at the appropriate significance level in the distribution.33 The authors acknowledge 
that the use of the sub-sampling approach makes their test conservative. These tests are 
conducted in the statistical software, Model Risk 4.0, by Vose Software (Vose, 2011).  
3.5.4.2 Performance-based measurement 
In addition to statistical testing, the portfolio manager would be more interested in specific 
performance ratios. This study employs three such ratios. The Treynor and Sharpe ratios are 
used to determine exposure (if any) to unsystematic and total risk; and the Sortino ratio is 
used as a ranking criterion. These ratios are calculated on a rolling window period using a 
minimum return period of 12 months. The risk-free rate used in this study is 3-month T-bill 
rate.  
The Treynor ratio is given as: 
 M. N1-. =  .O − .PQ  {13} 
Where rp is the return on the portfolio at time t, rf is the risk free rate and β is the relationship 
of systematic risk between the portfolio and the market proxy (given by the ALSI). 
The Sharpe ratio is defined analogously: 
 Rℎ/.T =  .O − .PU  {14} 
where σ is a measure of standard deviation (or total risk). 
Lastly, the Sortino ratio is given as: 
 R-.HV1- =   −   
{15} 
  = {mın[ −  , 0]}  {16} 
Where OB is defined as downside risk (as before), R is the return of the portfolio and B is the 
target return. 
                                                 
33
 The interested reader is referred to Linton, Massoumi and Whang (2005) for a detailed discussion.  
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3.5.4.3 Summary 
In summary, the fusion strategy can neatly be described by five procedures. 
Procedure 1: Form and rank portfolios based on the B/M ratio. 
Procedure 2: Calculate the Piotroski Score for the highest quartile of the B/M ranking and 
rank firms according to this score. 
Procedure 3: Calculate the 12 month price momentum for the top 33% of Piotroski score 
shares and rank shares according to this score. 
Procedure 4: Initiate a 12 month buy and hold based on the top quintile of momentum 
rankings. Repeat the momentum ranking for each calendar month. 
Procedure 5: Evaluate the returns from the fusion strategy via stochastic dominance tests and 
performance ratios.  
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4 Results 
Analysis of the results obtained from the fusion strategy begins with an examination of each 
screening criterion. Portfolio returns are investigated, ending with tests for stochastic 
dominance and robustness tests.  
4.1 Screening criteria 
As the number of firms in the sample varied each year, the sample of value firms would thus 
change each year. Table 1 below shows pertinent figures of the value screen. As the number 
of value firms increase each year, their maximum B/M value is erratic, whilst their minimum 
B/M value is relatively low. Downward revisions to this ratio seem to occur at the pre-
emptive stage for a recession, such as during 1995 and 2005. 
Table 1 – The value screen 
Year Sample total Size of value quartile Maximum B/M ratio  Minimum B/M ratio of   
1990 113 24 9.42 1.69 
1991 120 30 8.09 1.42 
1992 134 33 13.41 1.50 
1993 138 34 32.09 1.83 
1994 143 35 11.51 1.42 
1995 144 36 9.83 0.92 
1996 154 38 18.17 0.80 
1997 158 39 7.68 0.92 
1998 167 41 7.77 1.16 
1999 188 48 11.60 1.59 
2000 228 57 12.95 1.58 
2001 239 59 11.86 1.46 
2002 241 60 20.72 1.47 
2003 246 61 44.81 1.52 
2004 244 61 18.41 1.46 
2005 244 61 34.59 1.00 
2006 260 65 11.30 0.33 
2007 272 68 18.29 0.19 
2008 307 76 9.42 0.17 
2009 340 85 7.66 0.20 
Note: The respective year’s B/M value relates to the respective fiscal year end. For example, the first row of 
Table 1 shows the number of firms in the 1990 fiscal year regardless of when the firm’s fiscal year ends. 
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For a graphical representation of the above table, the B/M ratios are logarithmically 
differenced and are shown in Figure 6 below. The decline in the minimum log(B/M) value for 
the value quartile is an interesting observation. This decline begins in 2005 and seems to 
correspond to the global recession experienced thereafter. Further analysis (left for future 
research) should be conducted to determine if there were any common characteristics shared 
between these firms (for example, they could be classified as defensive firms – firms that 
perform well during a recession).  
 
 
Figure 6 – Logarithm of maximum and minimum B/M ratios  
For this study, those firms that had a Piotroski in the top 33rd percentile (in other words, a 
score of 7 or more) passed the Piotroski screen. Table 2 shows these results. As the fusion 
strategy relies on sequential screening, Piotroski scores are calculated for the value quartile 
only.  
Table 2 – The Piotroski screen 
Year Total number of 
value firms 
Number of firms with 
a score of 7 or more 
% of firms that passed 
the screening criterion 
1990 24 0 0 
1991 30 2 6.67 
1992 33 2 6.06 
1993 34 5 14.71 
1994 35 8 22.86 
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1995 36 6 16.67 
1996 38 6 15.79 
1997 39 4 10.26 
1998 41 7 17.01 
1999 48 7 14.58 
2000 57 5 8.77 
2001 59 8 13.56 
2002 60 16 26.67 
2003 61 16 26.23 
2004 61 11 18.03 
2005 61 9 14.75 
2006 65 12 18.46 
2007 68 5 7.35 
2008 76 5 6.58 
2009 85 15 17.65 
 
The number of firms that pass the Piotroski screen seems to roughly follow a cyclical pattern, 
as shown in Figure 7 below. During periods of prosperity, such as the mid-2000s, more firms 
are financially sound whereas during periods of austerity, fewer firms are financially sound.  
 
Figure 7 – Number of firms with a Piotroski score of 7 or more 
Closing prices for each month were used in calculating the discrete returns for those shares 
that remained. The 12 month past return was used to rank shares each month. The top quintile 
is referred to as the winner portfolio, whilst the bottom quintile is referred to as the loser 
portfolio. Table 3 below shows the size of the top quintile. Whilst the absolute number of 
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firms may appear small, note that the composition of the top quintile is not necessarily the 
same each month. Due to monthly rankings, a particular share may enter the top quintile in 
month one and exit in month two, while another share may exit at a later date. Given that the 
strategy employs strict criteria, if a larger number of shares passed all criteria, it would 
provide a greater likelihood of (relatively) poor performance of the portfolio. By examination 
of the last column, the 95th percentile of shares forms the portfolio.  
Table 3 – The momentum screen 
Year Size of the 
winner 
portfolio 
Number of 
firms in after 
the Piotroski 
Screen 
Number of 
firms after the 
Value Screen 
%  of winner 
firms to the 
Piotroski 
Screen 
% firms that 
passed all 
screening 
criteria. 
1990 0 0 24 0.00 0 
1991 1 2 30 50.00 3.33 
1992 1 2 33 50.00 3.03 
1993 1 5 34 20.00 2.94 
1994 2 8 35 25.00 5.71 
1995 1 6 36 16.67 2.78 
1996 1 6 38 16.67 2.63 
1997 1 4 39 25.00 2.56 
1998 1 7 41 14.29 2.44 
1999 1 7 48 14.29 2.08 
2000 1 5 57 20.00 1.75 
2001 2 8 59 25.00 3.39 
2002 3 16 60 18.75 5.00 
2003 3 16 61 18.75 4.92 
2004 2 11 61 18.18 3.28 
2005 2 9 61 22.22 3.28 
2006 2 12 65 16.67 3.08 
2007 1 5 68 20.00 1.47 
2008 1 5 76 20.00 1.32 
2009 3 15 85 20.00 3.53 
 
In contrast to the number of firms in the Piotroski screen, the momentum screen (shown in 
Figure 8 below) does not have any discernable cyclicality present that can be explained via 
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the business cycle. The number of shares in the fusion strategy appears independent of any 
business cycle (or rather independent of prosperous and austere periods).  
 
Figure 8 – Number of firms that pass all three screening criteria 
4.2 Portfolio returns 
Using those shares that passed all screening criteria, the 12 month momentum strategy is 
examined. Transaction costs of 1% per each return in the cross-sectional average are 
imposed, initially. Sensitivity analysis of the level of transaction costs is also conducted. 
Throughout this study, these 12 month momentum strategy returns are referred to as the 
“fusion strategy” returns. An apparent caveat in this calculation lies in the feasibility of these 
returns in a real world scenario. Thus far, these transaction returns inherently ignore the 
amount of funds available to the investor – the investor could very well invest large amounts 
of money into each share and be highly leveraged. 
An alternative (and perhaps more realistic) indication of the results would be to consider a 
hypothetical mutual fund that invests according to the fusion strategy. These results would be 
more beneficial to a typical investor who can enter or exit the fund at any point in time. In 
this hypothetical fund, capital is either invested in domestic equity or risk-free government 
bonds. The fund’s mandate allows it to invest 3% of available capital into a share. If five 
shares are bought in a particular month, then 15% of capital is invested in equity. This rule 
still applies when a particular share is bought for any number of consecutive months. For 
example, if share X is bought for 3 consecutive months, the fund has invested 15% of capital 
into share X. Transaction costs of 1% are imposed on each percentage holding in the portfolio 
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every month, initially. This accounts for the scenario where the fund liquidates its position at 
the end of every month. Whilst this is not an entirely accurate description of returns of the 
strategy, it does provide the benefit of a worst-case scenario. The remaining capital is 
invested in risk-free government bonds. Thus, the return to this fund is a linear combination 
of the returns from equity and the returns from fixed income.  Returns for equity are 
calculated as the monthly changes in share prices in which the fund holds a percentage and 
are equally weighted.34  Throughout this study, these returns are referred to as the “fusion 
fund” returns. 
The performance of the fusion strategy is now compared to several benchmarks. The 
benchmarks selected can be categorised into active and passive benchmarks. The passive 
benchmarks used were the All Share Index (ALSI) (JSE code: J203) and the Small Cap Index 
(JSE code: J202).  The ALSI can be considered representative of the South African market 
for share trading (barring any finer points on its efficiency or the extent of this 
representativeness). From the perspective of the average investor, the ALSI represents the 
market. The first screening criterion for the fusion strategy selects those shares that are 
inexpensive based on their B/M values – some of which could have small capitalisation 
values. This is the primary motivation for selecting the Small Cap Index as the other passive 
benchmark. In a South African context, the ALSI is dominated by large capitalisation firms. 
If the fusion strategy primarily selects small capitalisation firms, it is logical to compare 
performance against a suitable index. The active benchmarks were selected from the universe 
of unit trusts35. Those unit trusts that are advertised as “moderate to high risk”, invest only in 
domestic equity and follow a semblance of a typical value strategy were selected to be 
compared with the fusion strategy. As unit trusts are actively managed instruments, the Total 
Expense Ratio (TER)36 as well as management fees were considered in performance 
comparison. In total, the fusion strategy is compared against two passive benchmarks and 
four active benchmarks37. An important caveat in the comparison relates to the data points 
                                                 
34
 Arguably, one could use value-weightings to calculate returns. As such, a comparison between the equally 
weighted return of the fusion strategy (fund) and an artificial equally weighted ALSI is conducted in 
Appendix C. 
35
 Unit trusts are open-ended collective investments that offer access to a wide range of securities. Each unit 
trust follows a mandate and investment objective, typically given by a style of investing. 
36
 TER is a measure of the total cost of the fund to an investor. It includes a variety of administrative costs. 
37
 Details on the active benchmarks are obtainable upon request. 
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used in the testing. The passive benchmarks contain data for at least 15 years whilst the active 
benchmarks (ranging in data points) contain data for at least 4 years.  
Assuming returns to be normally distributed, Table 4 below shows the descriptive statistics of 
the fusion strategy and fund returns. The mean return of the fusion strategy is 2.75% per 
month. Whilst this is impressive, the high standard deviation shows that the strategy is quite 
volatile (indeed the highest when compared to its benchmarks), also given by the large range 
between maximum and minimum returns. Overall, the fusion strategy generates positive 
returns (given by skewness) and high returns (given by kurtosis).  
The ALSI and Small Cap benchmarks both have similar means and standard deviations. 
Whilst there are differences between their skewness and kurtosis, the distributions appear 
approximately normal, relative to some of the active benchmarks. The Small Cap index does 
have a smaller beta than the ALSI. As beta is a measure of systematic risk only, it does not 
adequately capture the risks prevalent in small capitalisation firms. Three of the four active 
benchmarks exhibit greater mean returns and standard deviations than the passive 
benchmarks. The exception of Fund B’s lower mean and standard deviation is most likely a 
result of the low number of observations. Each of the benchmarks (both passive and active) 
all have a lower number of observations than the fusion strategy. This is due to data 
collection constraints.  
Lastly, it can be seen that all of the active benchmarks possess lower betas than the ALSI, 
indicative of good defensive strategies (which inherently implies good diversification 
according to MPT). The fusion strategy has a high beta of 1.70, indicative of its 
aggressiveness (and perhaps poor diversification – to be examined later).  
Table 4 – Descriptive statistics with the fusion strategy 
Descriptive Statistic Value 
 ALSI Small Cap Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fusion 
Mean (%) 0.79 0.75 1.19 0.01 1.04 0.88 2.75 
Standard Deviation (%) 1.32 1.63 1.45 0.13 1.72 1.54 4.00 
Skewness -0.52 -0.01 -0.66 -0.31 -1.09 -0.68 1.06 
Kurtosis -0.44 -0.96 -0.94 -1.06 -0.26 -0.93 3.09 
Maximum (%) 2.87 3.28% 2.98 0.23 2.64 2.67 18.47 
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Minimum (%) -2.56 -2.73 -1.58 -0.23 -2.70 -2.08 -5.10 
Observations 165 165 61 36 64 64 195 
β (Beta)* 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.05 1.00 0.90 1.70 
*Note: Q = WXCYZ[,\][∗]\ . Calculations for beta used the ALSI as the market proxy and restricted the number of 
observations to the minimum present in both data series.  
The returns for the fund, given in Table 5 below, are (expectedly) more realistic. The mean 
return for the fund is 0.42% with a standard deviation of 0.38%. The performance of most of 
the active benchmarks appears poor when using monthly differences, also coupled with their 
higher standard deviations. It is surprising to observe that the range between maximum and 
minimum values (notwithstanding the values themselves) reflect poorly on the benchmarks’ 
performance and high volatility present in monthly fluctuating prices. The fund shows some 
negative skewness and some excess kurtosis, indicative that the returns are close to 
approximating a normal distribution.  It has the lowest beta (of approximately zero). The 
large difference between the fusion strategy and fusion fund beta could be a result of the 
return calculation employed. The higher number of observations for the fund method is due 
to the manner in which returns were calculated. The fund method does not require 12 month 
buy and hold returns but rather monthly changes in the fund’s value. As such, the number of 
observations is higher.  
Table 5 – Descriptive statistics with the fusion fund 
Descriptive Statistic Value 
 ALSI Small Cap Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund 
Mean (%) 0.51 0.48 0.11 -0.88 -0.27 -0.13 0.42 
Standard Deviation (%) 5.09 5.16 3.87 4.08 4.25 3.94 0.39 
Skewness -1.06 -1.11 -1.30 -0.88 -1.07 -1.77 -0.45 
Kurtosis 2.47 4.30 2.19 1.10 2.24 5.77 1.67 
Maximum (%) 11.60 13.40 5.78 7.79 7.48 6.13 1.49 
Minimum (%) -20.44 -27.71 -14.60 -13.50 -16.59 -19.35 -0.90 
Observations 186 186 82 57 85 85 217 
β (Beta)* 1.00 0.80 0.78 0.70 0.80 0.780 0.03 
 
Figure 9 below plots the returns over the sample period of the fusion strategy. With the 
exception of relatively abnormally high returns during the 1994 to 1995 period, the fusion 
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strategy returns seem to exhibit cyclical behaviour. This indicates that the shares selected are 
still prone to systematic risk. This can be seen by the negative returns during the 2009 period 
– coinciding with the global financial recession.  
 
Figure 9 – Fusion strategy returns 
In Figure 10 below, the returns of the fusion fund exhibit the typical volatility of share 
returns. The returns however still seem to weakly follow the fusion strategy returns. Periods 
of low returns for the fusion fund do not completely correspond to periods of low returns for 
the fusion strategy. This could imply that by calculating returns as monthly fluctuations, the 
investor may be tempted to prematurely exit the fusion fund due to high volatility. 
 
Figure 10 – Fusion fund returns 
 
4.3 Risk-adjusted performance 
A portfolio manager would have his fund’s performance measured via performance ratios, 
such as the Sharpe and Treynor ratios. From a risk-based perspective, market (or systematic) 
risk is always present in portfolios. The benefit of diversification to portfolios assists in 
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eliminating firm-specific (unsystematic) risk. To informally examine the amount of exposure 
to either systematic or unsystematic risk, these measures are calculated for the fusion 
strategy, the fusion fund, as well its comparative benchmarks. As such, one would expect, a 
priori, that the Sharpe ratio would be higher than the Treynor ratio. This can be explained as 
follows. If the excess return, the numerator in both of the above ratios, is held constant, a 
lower denominator (given either by β or σ) would translate into a higher overall ratio. 
Further, if systematic risk is always present in any portfolio, undiversified portfolios will 
have a higher standard deviations (σ’s). Thus, the Sharpe ratio would be higher than the 
Treynor ratio. 
Upon examination of Table 6 below, the majority of Treynor ratios are lower than their 
corresponding Sharpe ratios, with the exception of Fund B (with its associated fusion strategy 
comparison) and the Small Cap index only. This implies that the fusion strategy and the 
benchmarks have relatively good levels of diversification. The large negative values for the 
Sharpe ratio of Fund B (as well as the fusion strategy) could be explained by the 
measurement period used for the fund. Returns to Fund B were calculated with the initial data 
point beginning in January 2008. At the onset of a global recession, the returns to Fund B 
were particularly low.  
The fusion strategy performs better than the passive benchmarks (the ALSI and Small Cap 
Index) under the Sharpe ratio. In the parlance of portfolio management language, the fusion 
strategy provides greater returns per unit of total risk (given by σ) against both the passive 
benchmarks. The fusion strategy performs better than the ALSI and worse than the Small Cap 
index under the Treynor ratio. The results for the active benchmarks are somewhat 
unfavourable towards the fusion strategy. Funds A, C and D all perform better than the fusion 
strategy, as given by the Sharpe and Treynor ratios (the exception being the lower Treynor 
ratio for Fund C than the fusion strategy). The ratios for Fund B indicate that it performed 
drastically worse than the fusion strategy. As expressed earlier, this could possibly be due to 
the measurement period of returns for Fund B.  
If the ratios were examined from a cross-sectional, risk-based perspective, it can be seen that 
(again with the exception of the Small Cap index and Fund B) all remaining benchmarks as 
well as the fusion strategy possess greater Sharpe ratios than Treynor ratios. This indicates 
that unsystematic risk is present, as the portfolios are not well diversified. Further, the fusion 
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strategy is less diversified when compared to the ALSI, Small Cap index and Fund A; and 
lower levels of unsystematic risk when compared to Funds B, C and D.  
Table 6 – Sharpe and Treynor ratios using returns from the fusion strategy 
 Sharpe Ratio Treynor Ratio Difference 
(Sharpe - Treynor) 
Fusion 0.68 0.01 0.67 
ALSI 0.01 0.00 0.01 
    
Fusion 0.68 0.01 0.67 
Small Cap -0.16 0.03 -0.19 
    
Fusion 2.29 0.01 2.28 
Fund A 3.90 0.03 3.87 
    
Fusion -0.28 -0.01 -0.27 
Fund B -4.11 -0.09 -4.02 
    
Fusion 2.69 0.00 2.69 
Fund C 4.09 -0.03 4.12 
    
Fusion 2.69 0.00 2.69 
Fund D 4.62 0.02 4.60 
 
Using the fusion’s fund based returns, the results from Table 7 below are less than 
encouraging. In all comparisons, the fusion fund performs worse than its benchmarks under 
both the Sharpe and Treynor ratios (the exception, albeit minor, is that Fund B’s Sharpe ratio 
is more negative than the fusion strategy). Once again, the fusion fund is less diversified than 
its peers. 
Table 7 – Sharpe and Treynor ratios using returns from the fusion fund 
 Sharpe Ratio Treynor Ratio Difference 
(Sharpe - Treynor) 
Fund -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 
ALSI 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
Fund -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 
Small Cap -0.03 0.00 -0.03 
    
Fund -0.13 -0.01 -0.12 
Fund A 0.10 0.00 0.10 
    
Fund -0.23 -0.02 -0.21 
Fund B -0.23 -0.01 -0.22 
    
Fund -0.10 -0.01 -0.09 
Fund C -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
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Fund -0.10 -0.01 -0.09 
Fund D 0.03 0.00 0.03 
 
Attention is now turned to the Sortino ratio in Table 8 below. This ratio provides a measure 
of return per unit of downside risk. A higher Sortino ratio is indicative of a better managed 
investment portfolio. In contrast to the mixed results presented earlier, performance 
according to the Sortino ratio is more in favour of the fusion strategy. The strategy has higher 
Sortino ratios for all benchmarks except Fund A38.  The fusion strategy offers better capital 
preservation than the benchmarks used. This is particularly appealing to investors who wish 
to seek a form of assurance in financial returns (as counter-factual as the analogy may seem). 
 
Table 8 – Sortino ratios with the fusion strategy 
Portfolio Sortino Ratio 
Fusion 0.70 
ALSI -0.40 
  
Fusion 0.70 
Small Cap -0.68 
  
Fusion 0.35 
Fund A 0.57 
  
Fusion -0.64 
Fund B -10.01 
  
Fusion  0.29 
Fund C 0.27 
  
Fusion  0.31 
Fund D 0.24 
 
When comparing performance using the fusion fund, the results are disappointing. The fusion 
fund has a lower Sortino ratio than all benchmarks, shown in Table 9 below. This implies that 
the fusion fund does not offer better downside risk protection (capital preservation).  
 
 
Table 9 – Sortino ratios with the fusion fund 
Portfolio Sortino Ratio 
Fund -0.28 
ALSI -0.03 
                                                 
38
 This also serves as an indirect validation of the superior performance of Fund A, given by the accolades this 
fund has earned. 
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Fund -0.27 
Small Cap -0.06 
  
Fund -0.39 
Fund A -0.02 
  
Fund -0.57 
Fund B -0.45 
  
Fund -0.37 
Fund C -0.08 
  
Fund -0.38 
Fund D -0.09 
 
The mixed set of results between the fusion strategy and fusion fund can be explained via the 
return calculation method. For the fusion fund, the use of monthly calculations clearly leads 
to different results. Whilst the fusion fund may be more practical for the investor, the 
monthly observation of price fluctuations could induce the fund’s participants to prematurely 
exit the fund. Thus, the results of the fusion strategy are preferred over that of the fusion 
fund, as it, in effect, behoves the investor to have funds that cannot be liquidated until the 
holding period expires. 
4.4 Statistical results 
The tests for stochastic dominance were conducted in Microsoft Excel®, using the add-in 
Model Risk 4.0 by Vose Software (Vose, 2011). This statistical tool is designed to work in a 
similar manner to other formulae present in Microsoft Excel and provide the user with a final 
outcome. Using the function, vosedominance, one of three outcomes is possible. The first 
distribution can show first or second order dominance over the second distribution, or the 
result could be inconclusive – indicative that perhaps higher order dominance is possible. 
These results are also presented in graphical form, in the manner shown in Section 3.5.2. It is 
important to note that due to differing measurement periods used, whichever strategy is found 
to be the stochastically dominant one, does not imply that over the entire sample period, the 
said relationship will hold.  
The test for stochastic dominance shows inconclusive results for the fusion strategy and all 
benchmarks, except Fund B. With Fund B, the fusion strategy is second order dominated by 
Fund B, shown in Figure 11 below. The difference in area under the curves of the fusion 
strategy and Fund B shows that Fund B has a lower area. In summary, the risk-averse 
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investor will choose Fund B over the fusion strategy whilst a risk-averse investor with 
decreasing risk aversion may (at the very least) choose the fusion strategy over all other 
benchmarks.39 These results conform to the stated objectives of Fund B – to outperform the 
market without taking on greater risk. The remaining cumulative distribution functions are 
shown in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 11 – CDFs of the fusion strategy and Fund B 
When using the returns of the fusion fund in place of the fusion strategy, the results are 
surprising. The results are inconclusive for the passive benchmarks (the ALSI and Small Cap 
index). This result is shown in Figure 12 below. In Figure 12, the area under the curve of both 
distributions does not provide a clear indication of superiority.  
 
Figure 12 – CDFs of the fusion fund and the Small Cap Index  
                                                 
39
 Recall that an inconclusive result could imply dominance at higher orders. At the very least, third order 
dominance is thus possible. 
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However, with all active benchmarks, the fusion strategy exhibits second order dominance. 
One of these results is shown in Figure 13 below. The difference in the area under the curves 
of the fusion fund and Fund B show that the fusion fund has the lower area. All remaining 
CDF plots are shown in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 13 – CDFs of the fusion fund and Fund B 
From a utility perspective, the risk-averse investor with decreasing risk aversion may (at the 
very least) choose the fusion fund over the passive benchmarks used whilst the risk-averse 
investor will choose the fusion fund over all active benchmarks used. This implies that the 
active benchmarks are better at preserving capital than the fusion fund; and the fusion fund 
offers better downside protection than the passive benchmarks used, with greater upside 
potential. This could possibly be due to the lack of diversification (or rather the lack of an 
objective to diversify) on the part of the fusion fund. Once again, for reasons outlined 
previously, the results from the fusion strategy are preferred over the fusion fund. 
4.5 Robustness tests 
4.5.1 Comparison with the business cycle 
Finance theory posits which shares perform best over stages of the business cycle. This view 
is often agreed upon and followed by many practitioners. The inherent difficulty in following 
a sector rotation strategy is to determine at which point the business cycle is currently in. 
Stangl, Jacobsen and Visaltanachoti (2009) test a sector rotation strategy to determine if there 
is any merit to following such an approach. A sector rotation strategy, like any other market 
timing strategy, relies on the accuracy of the forecaster in anticipating the correct stage of the 
business cycle. If the forecaster achieves this, he can outperform a simple buy-and-hold 
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strategy. Stangl et al. (2009) investigate the sector rotation strategy from this perspective (by 
assuming the forecaster has complete accuracy) and then investigate the strategy by relaxing 
the above assumption. Over the period 1948 to 2007, Stangl et al. (2009) find that the 
“perfect” forecaster earns risk-adjusted returns of 2.3% annually, excluding transaction costs. 
When the forecaster’s ability is less than perfect, this performance is significantly lowered to 
approximately 1% annually, excluding transaction costs. When outperformance is measured 
against other asset pricing models (such as the Fama-French three factor model (Fama & 
French, 1993)) or the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997), the results are largely 
unchanged. Thus, a sector rotation strategy was found to not earn significantly large 
abnormal returns.  
To disentangle the effects (if any) between the fusion strategy and market timing, a 
descriptive analysis is conducted. The figure and accompanying table below, from Stangl, 
Jacobsen and Visaltanachoti (2009) show which sectors display the best performance at each 
stage of the business cycle.  
 
Figure 14 – Stylised depiction of the business cycle 
 
Table 10 – Sector rotation according to the business cycle 
Three Stages of Expansion Two Stages of Recession 
Stage I Stage II Stage III Stage IV Stage V 
Technology: Basic materials: Consumer 
staples: 
Utilities: Consumer 
cyclical: 
Computer software Precious metals Agriculture Power and water 
utilities 
Apparel 
Measuring and control 
equipment 
Chemicals Beer and liquor Telecommunication Automobiles and 
trucks 
Computers Ore and metal 
processing 
Food products  Business supplies 
Electronic equipment Non-metallic and Healthcare  Construction 
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 metal mining 
Transportation: Capital Goods Medical 
equipment 
 Construction 
materials 
General transportation Fabricated 
products 
Pharmaceutical 
products 
 Consumer goods 
Shipping containers Defence Tobacco products  Entertainment 
 Machinery Energy:  Printing and 
publishing 
 Ships and railroad 
equipment 
Coal  Recreation 
 Aircraft Petroleum and 
natural gas 
 Retail 
 Electrical 
equipment 
  Rubber and plastic 
products 
 Services:   Textiles 
 
 Business services   Financial: 
 Personal services   Banking 
    Insurance 
    Real estate 
 
For each of the firms bought in the fusion strategy, the sector classification (as given by the 
JSE), is noted. Thereafter, the date of purchase is compared alongside the business cycle to 
examine any similarities that may exist. To determine South Africa’s progression through 
each stage of the business cycle, Composite Business Cycle indicators, supplied by the South 
African Reserve Bank, were used.  
A simple comparison of when the share was purchased relative to the stage of the business 
cycle shows that 15.4% of shares in the fusion strategy (fund) were bought at the time 
suggested by a sector rotation strategy. Arguably, if the fusion strategy did follow a sector 
rotation strategy, the above value would be higher. Thus, the fusion strategy’s performance is 
not necessarily due to following a sector rotation approach.  
4.5.2 Calendar effects 
Another anomaly in financial markets is the seasonality of share returns over distinct calendar 
periods (days, weeks or months). The best cited example would be the January effect – the 
tendency for shares to earn abnormal returns in the month of January for no viable reason. 
French (1980) shows that returns on the S&P500 are negative on Mondays. Keim and 
Stambaugh (1984) relate the Monday effect to the January effect – returns on Mondays 
during the month of January are positive, yet become negative for the remainder of the year. 
Some of these effects can be explained. For example, many firms in the United States have a 
tax year that ends in December. Thus, the January effect has been linked to the year-end 
pressure of tax-loss selling. This would suppress share prices in December to have them 
 revert and sometimes overshoot in January. In South Africa, most firms have a tax year 
ends in February. By the same reasoning, one would expect South African shares (belonging 
to South African companies) to have unusually high returns in 
(irrational) thought that posits that share prices in October tend t
catastrophic financial events have occurred in October, investors fear that every October, 
some catastrophic event will occur which will drive down prices. 
If the fusion strategy earns sign
reasons, it would not be a clear reflec
examine if any calendar effect is present, the returns for each calendar month are 
arithmetically averaged and then plotted in Figure
graphical evidence of the January effect
the lowest returns in October, indirectly confirming the intuition outlined above. 
Figure 15 – Analysis of calendar month returns
 
In Figure 16 below, the fusion fund appears to have the lowest return in June. These findings 
are corroborated by other South African studies, such as Auret and Cline (2011), who find no 
significant January effect (in addition to no significant size or value effect) on the JSE for the 
sample period of January 1996 to December 2006.
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 Figure 16 – Analysis of calendar month returns of the fusion fund
 
4.5.3 Sensitivity to transaction costs
Under a 1% transaction cost regime, the results of the fusion strategy and fund are promising. 
However, if this regime assumption is inappropriate given the nature of the fusion strategy, it 
follows that the sensitivity of 
transaction costs, namely 0.75% and 0.5% per month per share are now imposed. It is 
hypothesised that a lower transaction cost regime will improve the (already positive) outcome 
with respect to the success of the fusion strategy
The results for the portfolio performance measures are displayed in 
below. In Table 11, the results show that as the transaction costs decrease, the respective 
performance evaluation ratios increase in value (or decrease if the rat
However, these new values are not sufficient to change the conclusions reported previously.  
Table 11 – Sensitivity analysis of transaction costs for the fusion strategy
 Sharpe Ratio 
 0.75% 0.5%
Fusion 0.74 0.79
ALSI 0.01 0.01
   
Fusion 0.74 0.79
Small 
Cap 
-0.16 -0.16
   
Fusion 2.38 2.47
Fund A 3.90 3.90
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
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transaction costs should then be investigated. 
.  
Table 11 and Table 12
 
Treynor Ratio Sortino Ratio
 0.75% 0.5% 0.75% 
 0.01 0.01 0.77 
 0.00 0.00 -0.40 
   
 0.01 0.01 0.77 
 0.03 0.03 -0.68 
   
 0.01 0.01 0.40 
 0.03 0.03 0.57 
 
 Lower levels of 
 
io is negative). 
 
 
0.5% 
0.83 
-0.40 
 
0.83 
-0.68 
 
0.44 
0.57 
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Fusion -0.23 -0.21 0.00 0.00 -0.59 -0.54 
Fund B -4.11 -4.11 -0.09 -0.09 -10.01 -10.01 
       
Fusion 2.80 2.90 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.41 
Fund C 4.09 4.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.27 0.27 
       
Fusion 2.80 2.90 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.41 
Fund D 4.62 4.62 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.24 
 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the evaluation of the fusion fund’s returns in Table 
12 below. While the fusion fund does have more favourable portfolio performance ratios, 
most comparisons yield the results reported previously. There are, however, marginal 
differences in a few of these comparisons. For example, under a 0.5% transaction cost 
regime, the fusion fund does have a better Sharpe ratio than Fund B – a different conclusion 
to that reached under the 1% transaction cost regime. Under this same regime (of 0.5%), the 
fusion fund performs on par to the Small Cap index under the Sharpe ratio.  
Table 12 – Sensitivity analysis of transaction costs for the fusion fund 
 Sharpe Ratio Treynor Ratio Sortino Ratio 
 0.75% 0.5% 0.75% 0.5% 0.75% 0.5% 
Fund -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.28 -0.23 
ALSI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
       
Fund -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.28 -0.23 
Small Cap -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 
       
Fund -0.14 -0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.40 -0.36 
Fund A 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
       
Fund -0.24 -0.21 -0.02 -0.02 -0.58 -0.55 
Fund B -0.23 -0.23 -0.01 -0.01 -0.45 -0.45 
       
Fund -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.39 -0.34 
Fund C -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 
       
Fund -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.39 -0.34 
Fund D 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 
 
Indeed, the results for stochastic dominance tests remain identical to that of the 1% 
transaction cost regime. Namely, the tests for stochastic dominance show inconclusive results 
for the fusion strategy and all benchmarks, except Fund B. With Fund B, the fusion strategy 
is second order dominated by Fund B. When using the returns of the fusion fund in place of 
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the fusion strategy, the results are inconclusive for the passive benchmarks (the ALSI and 
Small Cap index). However, with all active benchmarks, the fusion strategy exhibits second 
order dominance. 
The regime that results in a break-even (or zero percentage) return presents an optimisation 
problem to solve. Using a 5% tolerance level and the quasi-Newton search method40, the 
level of monthly transaction costs that results in a 0% return, is 6.50% for the fusion strategy 
and 10.71% for the fusion fund.  It is important to note that these figures are economically 
significant, not necessarily statistically significant.41 As such, these amounts are difficult to 
justify in reality. However, one should note that these levels are maxima. For the fusion 
strategy to perform worse than its benchmarks, transaction costs would have to be greater 
than 1% and will differ for each comparison with a benchmark as each has a different average 
return. In other words, the level of transaction costs to enable the fusion strategy to perform 
worse than the ALSI would be different to that of Fund A, and so on.  
4.6 Statistical caveats 
4.6.1 Data mining bias 
The performance of the fusion strategy may simply be a result of data mining. Whilst this is 
an easy criticism to level against this study, the methodology and testing criteria are both 
robust and complete.  
4.6.2 Non-synchronous trading bias 
As the prices used to calculate returns are based on close of the last business day of the 
month, there can be a mismatch between the actual return each share earns. Further, as some 
of the shares are infrequently traded, the closing prices in the dataset may not be an accurate 
reflection of the actual closing prices at those specific points in time. 
4.6.3 Small sample bias 
Both the study period and the number of firms initially used are large enough to counter any 
claims against the use of a small sample. Upon formation of the portfolios, the number of 
shares included does not per se incorporate an adequate sample size. Thus, whilst the number 
of shares used in the fusion strategy is small, the process of arriving at the best shares to 
invest in is sufficiently large to curtail any small sample bias. 
                                                 
40
 A mathematical algorithm for finding local maxima and minima of functions. 
41
 Statistical significance would require a distribution to be fit to the data. 
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4.6.4 Time period bias 
As the study period incorporates many phases of the business cycle, the time period under 
investigation does not present any difficulty. Whilst structural breaks in the data (for example 
in 1994 and 1995 due to political instability and the elimination of the financial rand42, 
respectively) should have been incorporated, it is not paramount to the results generated.  
4.7 Potential causes of portfolio (under-) performance 
The profitability of any strategy needs to be examined in the context of any possible reasons 
for its performance. This section discusses some causes of the performance of the fusion 
strategy. 
Portfolio turnover relates to how often a manager buys and sells the constituents of the 
portfolio. The higher the turnover, the more often the manager engages in trading. Intuitively, 
a higher turnover will imply higher transaction costs. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that 
their J=6, K=6 momentum strategy generates significant turnover of 84.8% semi-annually. 
Not surprisingly, Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) find that the turnover generated from 
momentum strategies significantly affects the profits obtained from such strategies. Thus, the 
high turnover of the fusion strategy would have impacted its performance negatively. In the 
presence of the results outlined previously, this serves to strengthen the potential success of 
this strategy. An exercise of determining the optimal momentum strategy to use in the fusion 
strategy should be conducted in future research.  
Market capitalisation can be considered a proxy for liquidity. Those shares that have large 
market capitalisations generally trade more frequently than those with small market 
capitalisations. By the very nature of the fusion strategy, shares that are illiquid on the JSE 
are sometimes chosen. These illiquid shares do increase already high transaction costs which 
are sometimes mitigated by superior performance. It thus became necessary to not include a 
liquidity filter to exclude shares based on trading volume as a low trading volume could also 
lend credence to the neglected firm effect.   
A potential shortcoming in the implementation of the fusion strategy relates to the diffusion 
of financial statement information. A firm’s financial statements are not immediately released 
                                                 
42
 The financial rand was implemented in 1985 and abolished in 1995. It allowed for exchange rates on the rand, 
one for current account transactions and another for capital account transactions for non-residents (Jonnson, 
2001) 
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at their fiscal year end – there is a lag of approximately two months (or more). When the 
financial statements become publicly available, one would expect a revision (in either 
direction) of the firm’s share price. The methodology followed in this study raises a concern 
on not explicitly taking this lag into account. If financial statements are released after their 
fiscal year end, the first two screening criteria can only be evaluated at a later stage. In 
applying the fusion strategy to historical data, a lag of perhaps three months could be 
introduced. 
This study has offered an interpretation of a fusion strategy – a strategy which incorporates 
over- and under- reaction. Inherent in any new strategy, there will be flaws in the design 
process. First, the delineation points chosen for each screening criterion can be modified to 
produce another set of results. When analysing value shares, a quartile grouping provides 
enough diversification in the relative valuation ratios as well as allowing an appropriate 
amount of shares to be included therein. The minimum allowable Piotroski Score was chosen 
to be the top 33% of the score range as this allows the most fundamentally sound firms to be 
passed through the screen. For the momentum screen, a stricter grouping, that of quintiles, 
was chosen as the one year holding period could include exogenous events that could 
erroneously affect the ranking. The intuition underlying the stricter ranking rests on the 
premise that better quality shares will be passed through to be used in the strategy.  
The proxy used in the value screen could not be the most ideal. Perhaps other proxies such as 
Price to Earnings or Price to Cash Flow would provide better results. Further, Asness and 
Stevens (1995) show that value strategies are more effective when the proxy used is 
measured within the industry as opposed to across the market, as in this study. 
4.8 Discussion and inferences 
Asness (1997) investigates whether value and momentum strategies are independent or 
related. The author finds that a value strategy is particularly strong among low momentum 
(loser) shares and weak among high momentum (winner) shares. Similarly, a momentum 
strategy is strong among value shares and weak among growth shares. Whilst both strategies 
work independently, Asness (1997) finds that the returns generated from these independent 
strategies are negatively correlated; each strategy performs best when the other is held 
constant. In other words, a value strategy works best when momentum is held constant and a 
momentum strategy works best when the value proxy is held constant. This presents an 
interesting caveat for this study. In the initial screen, those shares that were value shares were 
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selected, with the growth shares (amongst the other quartiles) being discarded. Thus, the 
momentum strategy was effectively implemented on a value quartile. Of the value quartile, 
those shares that were inexpensive and had good levels of financial health were utilised in a 
momentum strategy. One would expect the results of Asness (1997) to not hold in this regard 
as the value shares used in Asness (1997) were not differentiated. It is plausible that firms 
examined by Asness (1997) were fundamentally weak and were included in the same quartile 
as those that were neglected. Indeed, the fusion strategy can be enhanced by short selling 
those shares that are value and low momentum whilst buying those shares that are growth and 
high momentum. 
A question asked by academics is whether performance should be interpreted as a 
behavioural phenomenon or an information-driven process. Studies such as Coval and 
Moskowitz (2001) indentify information as the primary reason for investment performance. 
Chen (2004) provides a theory of information relating to finance. This “Informational Theory 
of Investment” is based on the work of Shannon (1948) and aims to provide an understanding 
of observed market behaviours. The theory describes the investor (market participant) as 
having limited information processing capacity - the investor is boundedly rational (Sims, 
2003). Whilst the behavioural models offer compelling psychological evidence of certain 
phenomena, they often disagree on which phenomena are considered irrational. Information 
Theory, whilst not contradictory to the behavioural models, offers another viewpoint on the 
behaviour of market participants via mathematical systems. This theory can offer interesting 
avenues of research into the AMH discussed previously. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the fusion strategy incorporates both the under- and over- reaction hypotheses in a seemingly 
amiable manner. Further research, under the pretext of information theory, should be 
conducted as to the “inflection point” of where one hypothesis becomes the other. 
The investor who follows the above fusion strategy (in its current state) is indirectly 
conforming to the Behavioural Portfolio Theory of Shefrin and Statman (2000). This 
descriptive theory explores the construction of portfolios and the design of securities with 
relation to behavioural finance. The mean-variance investor will: evaluate a portfolio based 
on covariances between assets; care about expected returns and variance of the overall 
portfolio; have consistent attitudes towards risk and will always be risk-averse. The 
behavioural investor, in contrast, will build his portfolio as a pyramid of assets, where each 
layer represents a different risk and reward profile. In doing so, the role of covariance in 
portfolio construction is significantly lower compared to its role in mean-variance 
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optimisation. This does not imply however that covariances are ignored. They simply take 
less precedence in portfolio construction. Cash and bonds are held in the lowest level of the 
pyramid as protection against adverse outcomes, whereas growth shares are held in the higher 
levels to represent the profit potential of the portfolio. In practice, financial advisors suggest 
this approach to their clients (Fisher & Statman, 1997). The use of the fusion fund (with a 
percentage of capital invested in risk-free bonds) conforms to the idea of “pyramid portfolio 
construction”. It would be interesting to determine the optimum level of capital to hold in 
risk-free bonds which will maximise the returns of the fusion strategy. 
The predictions of behavioural portfolio theory (as per Shefrin & Statman, 1997) are as 
follows. Investors will (1) have a reluctance to invest in short or margined positions, (2) will 
exhibit home bias43 when selecting assets, (3) will utilise mental accounting in labelling 
securities (for example, growth and value), (4) will prefer assets with a minimum stated 
return and (5) will participate in risk seeking activities with some portion of their investment 
(such as the purchase of lottery tickets). Without an a priori objective of doing so, the fusion 
strategy, prima facie, meets the predictions of behavioural portfolio theory – there are no 
short positions, domestic equity (and bonds) are the only invested securities, labels are 
applied to portfolios, a minimum return was utilised in measuring performance according to 
the Sortino ratio and (perhaps) some of the shares chosen are more risky. 
 
 
  
                                                 
43
 An empirical anomaly in finance that states that domestic investors prefer to hold less than optimal amounts 
of foreign securities despite the benefits from international diversification (French and Poterba, 1991). 
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5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides concluding remarks on the study conducted and provides possible 
avenues for future research. 
5.1 Summary of findings 
The fusion strategy developed in this study utilised three screening criteria – a value, 
fundamental and momentum screen. Returns were calculated net of transaction costs, initially 
set to 1% per month, and were compared against two passive benchmarks and four active 
benchmarks after costs.  To provide greater tractability, a fusion fund was constructed as a 
more realistic means of investing to the typical investor. This fusion fund allocated 3% of 
capital to each share held in its portfolio at any given time. Returns were also calculated net 
of transaction costs of 1% per share, yet were done so on a monthly basis (in contrast to the 
12 month buy-and-hold returns of the fusion strategy). The fusion strategy (fund) was also 
compared against an (artificial) equally weighted ALSI. This comparison is found in 
Appendix C.  
Summary statistics show that the fusion strategy has the highest mean and standard deviation 
of all comparisons, whilst the fusion fund differs.  Statistical testing, done via stochastic 
dominance, yielded inconclusive results in the majority of cases. The exception however, was 
that Fund B stochastically dominated the fusion strategy at second order. This implies that a 
risk-averse investor would prefer to invest in Fund B and that Fund B has a greater 
probability of achieving higher returns than the fusion strategy. When using the returns from 
the fusion fund, the results are inconclusive compared to the passive benchmarks used yet the 
fusion fund dominates all active benchmarks at second order. This implies that a risk-averse 
investor will prefer the fusion fund compared to all active benchmarks used. This surprising 
result can be reconciled when one observes that the returns for the fusion fund are less 
volatile than its active peers and have a positive mean.  
However, it is interesting to note that the above results, whilst true statistically, do not 
provide a complete picture. By the use of Sharpe and Treynor measures, the fusion strategy 
yielded mixed results. However, the Sortino ratio shows that the fusion strategy outperforms 
all benchmarks chosen, except Fund A. When performance is evaluated using the fusion fund 
returns, all ratios (Sharpe, Treynor and Sortino) favour the respective benchmark against the 
fusion fund. The striking difference in performance results could be attributed to the 
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calculation of returns. As returns are measured as monthly fluctuations under the fusion fund, 
high volatility present in individual value shares may induce a lower mean return, thereby 
reducing the corresponding portfolio performance measure. Further, the investor may be 
tempted to pre-maturely exit the fusion fund due to these performance results as the true 
reflection of the 12 month buy-and-hold strategy may not be adequately captured in monthly 
fluctuations.   
The performance of the fusion strategy was also found to not be induced by either a sector 
rotation strategy or the existence of the January effect. Sensitivity to the level of transaction 
costs was also investigated. Lower levels (0.75% and 0.5%) of transaction costs enhanced the 
success and performance of the fusion strategy. Further, the level of transaction costs that 
results in a break-even return for the fusion strategy was found to be at least 6.50% per 
month. This amount is economically significant. Thus, notwithstanding the significant 
influence of transaction costs, the results are promising.  
5.2 Recommendations for future research 
An interesting area for future research would be the investigation of share volume with share 
performance, especially in the context of a fusion strategy. Arguably, the high level of 
transaction costs or the performance of the shares chosen by the fusion strategy could be 
linked to the trading volume of those shares. Literature shows that share returns and trading 
volume are jointly determined by the same market dynamics and are linked in theory (see for 
example, Blume, Easley & O’Hara, 1994). Lee and Swaminathan (2000) investigate the use 
of trading volume in predicting cross-sectional returns for momentum-styled portfolios. They 
find that the price momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reverses over long 
horizons. This suggests that price momentum is not only a function of market under-reaction 
but also of market over-reaction. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) also find that past trading 
volume predicts the magnitude and persistence of future price momentum. Specifically, high 
(low) volume winners (losers) experience faster momentum reversals. This result is depicted 
graphically in Figure 17 and has since become known as the Momentum Life Cycle 
Hypothesis. This presents yet another extension of this study and will perhaps offer 
explanations to the performance of the fusion strategy. 
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Figure 17 – Momentum life cycle hypothesis 
Perhaps the most significant field would be to further define (both mathematically and 
descriptively) the AMH (Lo, 2004; 2005) using the concepts developed in this study. An 
initial extension would be to test the fusion strategy in other markets. As South Africa has a 
relatively small securities exchange, if one were to have a larger initial sample, the fusion 
strategy can be more accurately assessed. This study has made no firm remarks about the 
representative agent who could prefer semi-variance or whose utility could be described by 
stochastic dominance axioms. This theoretical avenue should be pursued and perhaps 
combined with the extension of the AMH.   
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Appendix A 
This Appendix describes an alternative test for stochastic dominance developed by Davidson 
and Duclous (2000). It is important to note that as both the Linton et al. (2005) method as 
well as the test described here are valid, the choice is determined by the data to be analysed.  
  
The Davidson and Duclous (DD) (2000) test for stochastic dominance that is applicable to 
both independent and dependent samples from a joint distribution. The test compares the 
cumulative distribution functions over a grid of points. A potential caveat of the test is that 
the number of grid points is chosen arbitrarily and the consistency of the test statistic is 
affected by the use of a finite grid. The test is outlined in detail below.  
 
The following hypotheses are tested: 
 
1.H0: DWs xk= DLs xk∀ xk, k=1…K  
2.HA: DWs xk≠ DLs (xk) for some xk  
3.HA1: DWs xk> DLs (xk) for some xk  
4.HA2: DWs xk< DLs (xk) for some xk  
 
Davidson and Duclous (2000) construct the following sample statistics, where to avoid 
notation clutter; the grid index k is suppressed for each statistic: 
 _`ab 6 =  1c − 1! e6f − g["!(h
i
[j(
 
{A1} 
 _`kb6 =  1c − 1! e6f − l["!(h
i
[j(
 
{A2} 
 mnab = 1c o 1c − 1!  e6f − g[h"!( − _`ab 6
i
[j(
p {A3} 
 mnkb = 1c o 1c − 1!  e6f − l[h"!( − _`kb6
i
[j(
p {A4} 
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 mna,kb = 1c o 1c − 1!  e6f − g[h"!(6f − l[h"!( − _`ab 6_`kb6
i
[j(
p {A5} 
 mn "6 =  mnab 6 + mnkb6 − 2mna,kb 6 {A6} 
 
Consider the t-statistic:  
Mb6 =  _`ab 6 − _`kb6mnb6  
 
{A7} 
 
Under the null hypothesis, TS(x) is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate. To 
implement the DD test, we can compute a t-statistic at each grid point and reject the null 
hypothesis if the largest t-statistic is significant. As suggested by Davidson and Duclous 
(2000), the joint test size can be controlled by using critical values of the studentised 
maximum modulus (SMM) distribution in place of the normal distribution. Let q∞f6denote 
the (1- a) percentile of the SMM statistic with k and infinite degrees of freedom. Then, the 
following decision rules can be used: 
 
1. s, |M"6f|  <  q∞,Yf  ,-. u = 1, … , v Hℎ 1 /ww TH J' 
2. s, M"6f  <  q∞,Yf  ,-. /00 u /1$ −M"6f >  q∞,Yf  ,-. -x  u Hℎ 1 /ww TH Jy( 
3. s, −M"6f  <  q∞,Yf  ,-. /00 u /1$ M"6f >  q∞,Yf  ,-. -x  u Hℎ 1 /ww TH Jy 
4. s, M"6f >  q∞,Yf  ,-. -x  u /1$ − M"6f >  q∞,Yf  ,-. -x  u Hℎ 1 /ww TH Jy 
 
In empirical studies, the number of grid points is usually chosen based on rules of thumb. 
Barrett and Donald (2003) show that for reasonably large samples (greater than 500 
observations), the DD test works well for K = 10. Actual applications may require a finer grid 
because as Barrett and Donald (2003, p. 91) point out, a coarse grid may miss out important 
differences in the distributions. The 5% asymptotic critical value is 3.254 from Stoline and 
Ury (1979). 
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Appendix B 
This appendix provides cumulative distribution plots of those benchmarks not discussed in 
the text under a 1% transaction cost regime.  
In Figure B1 below, the fusion fund is neither first nor second order dominant against the 
ALSI. This could imply dominance at higher orders.  
 
Figure B 1 – CDF of ALSI and fusion fund 
In contrast, Figures B2, B3 and B4 all show that the fusion fund is second order dominant 
against its comparative benchmark. 
 
Figure B 2 – CDF of Fund A and fusion fund 
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Figure B 3 – CDF of Fund C and fusion fund 
 
Figure B 4 – CDF of Fund D and fusion fund 
 
In all remaining figures below (Figure B5 to Figure B9), the fusion strategy is neither first 
nor second order dominant against the comparative benchmark. This could imply dominance 
at higher orders.  
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Figure B 5 – CDF of ALSI and fusion strategy 
 
 
Figure B 6 – CDF of Small Cap Index and fusion strategy 
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Figure B 7 – CDF of Fund A and fusion strategy 
 
 
Figure B 8 – CDF of Fund C and fusion strategy 
 
Figure B 9 – CDF of Fund D and fusion strategy 
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Appendix C 
 
As the fusion strategy (fund) has returns that are equally weighted, perhaps a more accurate 
comparison would be with an equally weighted passive index. A comparison with an active 
benchmark is not required at this point as each unit trust, governed by its specific mandate, 
has the choice of calculating returns using the equally weighted or value weighted method.  
In South Africa, indices listed on the JSE are predominantly value weighted. Thus, an equally 
weighted index consisting of all shares listed on the JSE needed to be constructed. Total 
returns (inclusive of dividends) were averaged over each month from January 1989 to June 
2009. As this data was sourced from FinData@Wits, the end point does not correspond to the 
end point used in this study. Further, while a comparison of an equally weighted passive 
index to the equally weighted fusion strategy may be more accurate, it is not realistic per se 
for the typical investor. A typical investor would lack access to this index. Hence, this 
comparison is conducted for the purposes of a more accurate comparison, albeit at the cost of 
not being effectively replicated by the typical investor.  
The results from Table C1 below are mixed. For varying transaction cost regimes, the fusion 
strategy performs better than the equally weighted ALSI under the Sharpe and Sortino ratios 
and on par under the Treynor ratio. However, the fusion fund performs worse than the 
constructed index under all three performance ratios.  
Table C 1 – Performance evaluation ratios 
 Sharpe Ratio Treynor Ratio Sortino Ratio 
 1% 0.75% 0.5% 1% 0.75% 0.5% 1% 0.75% 0.5% 
Fusion 0.68 0.74 0.79 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.77 0.83 
ALSI 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.19 0.19 
          
Fund -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.28 -0.27 -0.23 
ALSI 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.54 0.54 
 
Tests for stochastic dominance show that the comparisons between the fusion fund and the 
equally weighted ALSI are inconclusive (implying third order dominance at the very least), 
while the fusion strategy is second order dominant over the constructed index. These results 
hold under the three different transaction cost regimes explored. Figure C1 and Figure C2 
below show the CDFs for the fusion fund and fusion strategy (both under the 1% transaction 
cost regime), respectively.  
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Figure C 1 – CDF of constructed ALSI with fusion fund 
 
Figure C 2 – CDF of constructed ALSI with fusion strategy 
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